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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS:
IS THERE LESS HERE THAN MEETS THE EYE?
Melvyn R. Durchslag*
INTRODUCTION
Printz v. United States' raised an issue of constitutional law that had not pre-
viously been determined, whether the United States could require executive state
officials to implement federal laws.2 As demonstrated by the 5-4 split on the Court
and the commentary in its wake, Printz was not an easy case. Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, began his analysis with a statement that has become increasingly
familiar in recent years: "Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this
precise question, the answer to the [constitutional] challenge must be sought in
historical understanding and practice."3 What made the decision in Printz stand out
from the crowd was not its explication of historical materials nor the way in which
these materials were detailed. Rather, it was the dispositive effect of one set of those
materials, The Federalist. Both Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justice Souter's
dissent focused on the language of various The Federalist in a way that can best be
described as the historical record equivalent of statutory interpretation. Justice
Scalia's word-for-word discussion of these early attempts to convince fence sitters
in New York to vote to ratify the proposed Constitution covers some six pages of the
United States Reports.4 Justice Souter's equally detailed discussion covers the same
number of pages.5 This comprises twelve pages of excruciating detail concerning
what we can or should imply from the language used (and not used) by Alexander
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I appreciate the efforts of
Jonathan Adler, Jessie Hill, Emery Lee, Andy Morriss, and Bob Strassfeld who read and
provided constructive and useful criticism of earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank my
research assistants who, over the course of several years of fits and starts, did much of the
detail work necessary to a project such as this. In alphabetical order they are Rami
Bardenstein, Elise Camita, Kimberly Eberwine, Rob Hahn, Carrie Nixon, and Michael Todd.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
2 Id. That is not entirely fair. While dealing with a requirement ostensibly imposed on
the states' legislative bodies, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion five years earlier in New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), noted that "[t]he Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." Id. at 188 (emphasis
added).
I Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
4 Id. at 910-15.
' Id. at 971-76 (Souter, J., dissenting).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Hamilton and James Madison. Certainly for Justice Souter, if not Justice Scalia,6
what Madison and Hamilton may or may not have suggested about the federal
government's authority to impress state officers in the service of national law was
determinative not only of the original understanding but, more importantly, the
outcome of the case. "In deciding these cases ... it is The Federalist that finally
determines my position. I believe that the most straightforward reading of No. 27
is authority for the Government's position here, and that this reading is both sup-
ported by No. 44 and consistent with Nos. 36 and 45."7 Because of the extraordinary
and, as this paper will demonstrate, rarely seen reliance upon The Federalist, some
illustration (in less than twelve pages) is required. First, Justice Souter:
Hamilton in No. 27 first notes that because the new Constitu-
tion would authorize the National Government to bind individuals
directly through national law, it could "employ the ordinary
magistracy of each [State] in the execution of its laws."... [H]e
states that "the legislatures, courts and magistrates of the res-
pective members will be incorporated into the operations of the
national government, as far as its just and constitutional authority
extends.".. .The natural reading... is not merely that the officers
of the various branches of state governments may be employed in
the performance of natural functions; Hamilton says that the state
governmental machinery "will be incorporated"
Madison in No. 44 supports this .... He asks why state
magistrates should have to swear to support the National
Constitution .... His answer is that national officials "will have
no agency in carrying the State Constitutions into effect. The
members and officers of the State Governments, on the contrary,
will have an essential agency in giving effect to the Federal
Constitution."
6 The Federalist was but one prong of a four-pronged argument by the majority. Justice
Scalia also found support for the decision in the practice of the Congress immediately after
ratification (also a historical argument), the constitutional structure, and the Court's prior
decisions. Consequently, it may be that Justice Scalia's extensive discussion of The
Federalist may have been largely in response to Justice Souter's dissent. On the other hand,
six pages seems a bit much, particularly if the other three prongs of the majority's analysis
are as strong as the majority would have one believe. Indeed, Justice Scalia's general
commitment to an originalist method of interpretation reinforces the conclusion that the
meaning of Hamilton and Madison's words are central both to his analysis and his result.
7 Printz, 521 U.S. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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... In No. 45, Hamilton says that if a State is not given (or
declines to exercise) an option to supply its citizens' share of a
federal tax, the "eventual collection [of the federal tax] under the
immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the
officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several
States." And in No. 36, he explains that the National Govern-
ment would more readily "employ the State officers as much as
possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of
their emoluments."8
Justice Scalia, for the majority, replies:
[NIone of these statements necessarily implies - what is the
critical point here - that Congress could impose these responsi-
bilities without the consent of the States. They appear to rest on
the natural assumption that the States would consent ....
... JUSTICE SOUTER finds "the natural reading" of the
phrases "will be incorporated into the operations of the national
government" and "will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement
of its laws" to be that the National Government will have
"authority.... when exercising an otherwise legitimate power
... , to require state 'auxiliaries' to take appropriate action."
These problems are avoided, of course, if the calculatedly
vague consequences the passage recites - "incorporated into
the operations of the national government" and "rendered
auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws" - are taken to refer to
nothing more (or less) than the duty owed to the National
Government, on the part of all state officials, to enact, enforce,
and interpret state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the
operation of federal law .... It also reconciles the passage with
Hamilton's statement in The Federalist No. 36 that the Federal
Government would in some circumstances do well "to employ
the state officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the
Union by an accumulation of their emoluments"....
JUSTICE SOUTER contends that his interpretation of The
Federalist No. 27 is "supported by No. 44".... In that Number,
Madison justifies the requirement that state officials take an
oath to support the Federal Constitution on the ground that they
"will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal
s Id. at 971-75 (first and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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Constitution." If the dissent's reading of The Federalist No. 27
were correct... one would surely have expected that "essential
agency" of state executive officers (if described further) to be
described as their responsibility to execute the laws enacted
under the Constitution. Instead... Federalist No. 44 continues
"The election of the President and Senate will depend,
in all cases, on the legislatures of the several States.
And the election of the House of Representatives will
equally depend on the same authority in the first in-
stance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by the
officers and according to the laws of the States."
It is most implausible that the person who labored for that
example of state executive officers' assisting the Federal
Government believed, but neglected to mention, that they had a
responsibility to execute federal laws.9
Printz is not the focus of this paper. It is, however, the inspiration for it. At the
time, I had not recalled reading a case in which The Federalist, by name, played
such a decisive role. Nor did I recall reading a case where the meaning of The
Federalist was so vigorously debated as it was in Printz. In only one other case did
I recall any Justice parsing the words used (or not used) by Publius in the way Justices
Scalia and Souter did in Printz.'o Was the discourse in Printz between Justices Scalia
and Souter unusual, something of an oddity even for prior Courts inclined to pay
homage to the "framers' intent?" Was it more than unusual? Was it unprecedented?
Has The Federalist taken on increased significance in recent years, or has it always
been of major importance in interpreting ambiguous constitutional text? These (and
others) are the questions that prompted this study and upon which it will hopefully
shed some light.
Interest in the Court's use of The Federalist is not new. Professor Charles
Pierson did an extensive study on the subject in 1924." Professor James Wilson did
the same in 1985.12 And in 1998 Professor Ira Lupu, in response to a provocative
article by Professor William Eskridge 3 did a decade-by-decade study of the number
' Id. at 910-15 (majority opinion) (second alteration and third omission in original)
(citations omitted).
10 See Unites States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
" Charles W. Pierson, The Federalist in the Supreme Court, 33 YALE L.J. 728 (1924).
12 James G. Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court's Use of The Federalist
Papers, 1985 BYU L. REV. 65 (1985).
"3 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1301 (1998) (arguing that courts
should reject legislative history in interpreting contemporary statutes but should rely on the
views of the framers in interpreting the Constitution).
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of times The Federalist was cited by the Supreme Court from 1790 through 1998.'
Professor Lupu's findings demonstrate that from 1980 to 1998, The Federalist was
cited more often by the Supreme Court than in the combined period from 1890 to
1979.15 These, and other efforts, are invaluable contributions to any discussion of
the reliance on history to interpret constitutional text. 16
This study expands upon the work of Professor Lupu and others, 17 but it is
different in several ways. First, while largely quantitative, this study is qualitative
as well. That is, it is an attempt to determine not only the number of cases in which
The Federalist was cited" or the theoretical reason why it was cited, 9 but more
significantly, the importance that The Federalist played, both in the analysis of the
Justices citing it and in the outcome reached by those Justices.2"
"4 Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1324 (1998) [hereinafter The Supreme Court and The Federalist]. In the same year, he
published a study of the most frequently cited The Federalist Papers. Ira C. Lupu, The Most
Cited Federalist Papers, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (1998); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1498 n.285 (1987) (arguing that the
Supreme Court early on accorded The Federalist a special status).
'5 The Supreme Court and The Federalist, supra note 14, at 1328.
16 Professor Peter Smith's recent study of"originalism" in the current Court concludes
that "originalism's advantage over other approaches to constitutional interpretation with
respect to its ability to constrain judicial discretion is marginal." Peter J. Smith, Sources of
Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court's Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 217, 284 (2004) [hereinafter Sources of Federalism]. More specifically, Professor
Smith's comparison between the federalism majority and the federalism dissenters reveals
that their respective use of historical materials depends on how much weight each gives to
the views of anti-Federalists. Id. at 257. The majority tends to read The Federalist, for
example, to suggest that the Constitution accommodates the views of the anti-Federalists,
whereas the dissenters read The Federalist Papers to suggest that the Constitution rejected
those concerns. Id. For an illuminating and useful, albeit abbreviated, history of originalist
analysis by the Supreme Court, see Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11-33 (1998).
17 Jack N. Rakove, Early Uses of The Federalist, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION: THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 234-49 (Charles R. Kesler ed., 1987);
Seth Barrett Tillman, The Federalist Papers as a Reliable Source for Constitutional
Interpretation, 105 W. VA. L. REV 601 (2003); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role
ofl'he Federalist in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337 (1998); David
McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: AlexanderHamilton, The Federalist and the Supreme
Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755 (2001).
18 The Supreme Court and The Federalist, supra note 14, at 1328; Wilson, supra note 12,
at 66.
"9 McGowan, supra note 17.
20 Importance in analysis and importance in outcome are obviously related. However, as
this study demonstrates, frequency of citation does not necessarily translate into importance,
either in analysis or outcome, a conclusion which is hardly new. See Rakove, supra note 17,
at 248. Consequently, my conclusions differ from those of Professor Wilson, who appears
at points to equate frequency of citation to analytical importance. See, e.g., Wilson, supra
2005]
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The concentration of this article on the importance of The Federalist to the
opinion's analysis and eventual outcome is differently focused than Professor
Manning's study, which analyzed whether or not The Federalist was cited as
"'authoritative' evidence of... intent."'2 Sometimes the two are the same, but not
inevitably so. The Federalist can be read as authoritative on the question of original
understanding, but original understanding may be largely unimportant to a Justice's
analysis. In that event, this study would conclude that The Federalist Papers cited
were an insignificant influence on the Justice's analysis and/or conclusion. Con-
versely, it may be that original understanding was a significant aspect of analysis
and/or result but The Federalist Papers cited were unimportant, either generally or
relatively, to determining what that understanding was. In that case, this analysis,
and that of Professor Manning, would converge. The Federalist would be both
insignificant (no matter how many times it was cited) and not "authoritative."
This study, unlike that of Professor McGowan, is not an attempt to determine
the reasons or the purposes for citations to The Federalist.22 Nor does this paper
reach any normative judgments about which reasons are defensible. Nevertheless,
Professor McGowan's work may well shed light on some of the conclusions this
paper reaches regarding the significance of The Federalist to the opinion's outcome.
For example, McGowan concludes that for much of the 18th and 19th centuries, the
Court used The Federalist Papers "as a source of wisdom that might enlighten [it]
on how to interpret the Constitution in a particular case. On this view, The
Federalist would be the rough equivalent of Blackstone, Coke, or Kent., 23 Citing
The Federalist as a source of wisdom aids in establishing the Court's "ethos" as an
institution wedded to a method ofjudging that transcends the parties to the litigation
and the politics that generated the dispute.24 The Federalist, in other words, is cited
less for its authoritativeness in interpreting Constitutional text than for establishing
the Court as an objective and trustworthy arbitrator.25 Indeed, if McGowan is
correct, the reasons for mentioning The Federalist may have little to do either with
the analysis or the outcome reached by the citing Justice.
This might well explain, for example, why a decidedly originalist Taney Court,
while mentioning The Federalist frequently, seemingly placed no more reliance (and
often less) on The Federalist Papers than on a number of other interpretative
sources.26 It may also explain why Justice Thomas's historical analysis sometimes
note 12, at 85, 86, 89, 90, 92, 94-99.
21 John F. Manning, supra note 17, at 1337 n.3. See also Sources of Federalism, supra
note 16 (refuting the idea that originalism hinders judges from allowing their personal views
to dominate their legal analysis).
22 McGowan, supra note 17, at 755.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 822-25.
25 Id. at 824.
26 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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eschews reliance on The Federalist in favor of other historical evidence, 27 or why
Justice Scalia's frequent citations to The Federalist seem, at times, to be
innocuous.28 Finally, Professor McGowan's "ethos" explanation might shed light
on the frequency of The Federalist citations by Justices not ordinarily thought of as
originalists: Justices Brennan and Douglas, for example.
Second, as the next section reveals, this study looks at a variety of matters
pertaining to citation to The Federalist, including the Justice citing The Federalist
and the pattern of that Justice's citations, and whether the citations appear in major-
ity, dissenting, or concurring opinions. Finally, as is also explained in the next
section, this study is not broken down decade-by-decade, but rather "era-by-era."
Consequently, it may be difficult to compare exactly the quantitative aspects of this
study with those who, like Professor Lupu, used different time periods. To assist in
that regard (as well as to provide the reader with a starting place for evaluating my
conclusions) an appendix is attached.
As the title of this paper suggests, the quantitative measure of increasing
citations to The Federalist Papers, whether measured in absolute terms, the rate of
citation per case decided,29 or in the percentage increase from one era to another, do
not match my conclusions regarding the importance of The Federalist Papers to
Constitutional interpretation.
I. CONSTRUCTION OF THE STUDY
The Appendix illustrates how the study was conducted. The vertical part of the
grid divides the decisions into nine periods of time, the first being the pre-Marshall
period extending from 1789 to 1800. This is followed by the John Marshall years,
1800 to 1835. The third time period is from 1835 to 1865, the end of the Civil War.
This is followed by the period between 1865 and 1900 (roughly the post-Civil War
period to the election of Theodore Roosevelt and the beginning of the Progressive
Era), which is then followed by the period between 1900 and 1937 when the
Franklin D. Roosevelt appointees assumed control of the Court. The sixth period
extends from 1937 to 1953, the beginning of the "Warren Era." The seventh period
is the years of the Warren Court, from 1953 to 1969, followed by the Burger years,
from 1969 to 1986. The final period is the current one, the Rehnquist years from
1986 to 2002, the year selected to cut off the empirical study.
27 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 n.1, 847 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-87 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). The inconsistency, however, might lead a cynic to conclude the reliance on The
Federalist is simply strategic or opportunistic.
28 See infra notes 458-60, 479-82 and accompanying text.
29 See The Supreme Court and The Federalist, supra note 14, at 1328 n.2.
2005] 249
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Several things may have occurred to the reader even at this early juncture. First,
why were the periods selected as they were, particularly in light of the decade-by-
decade data already accumulated? Second, which is prompted by the first, aren't the
temporal divisions both arbitrary and inconsistent? Four of the nine periods are
defined by who was serving as Chief Justice while five span the stewardship of at
least two and, in several cases, three Chief Justices. Why not either define all "eras"
by decades, by the presiding Chief Justice, or some other way? Admittedly, the lines
drawn here are, like most lines, arbitrary in the sense that one can think of different,
even arguably better, dividing points. Moreover, the lines, particularly those that
define the "era" by the Chief Justice, are overly simplistic - they fail to account for
a variety of factors that influence what prompts Justices to decide as they do and
how shifts occur during those periods of stewardship.30 If those are the criteria, the
plea is guilty. On the other hand, there are good reasons to temporalize as I did.
First, the decade-by-decade approach was rejected despite its ease because the
purpose of this study is not simply to replicate, question, or expand upon previous
studies. Moreover, a decade-by-decade analysis takes no account of what else was
occurring in the country that might (or might not) have influenced how cases were
decided. Nor does it account for the influence of particular Justices or Chief Justices
on the Court's approach to constitutional interpretation, at least not without some
significant extrapolation of the data. To explore or even speculate on these matters
is beyond the scope of this paper and the expertise of the author. Others more com-
petent and better trained may, however, find this breakdown helpful.
The periods could have been defined by who was serving as Chief Justice. That
was rejected as well. Between 1789 and 2002 there have been fifteen Chief Justices.
Some, like John Marshall, Roger B. Taney, Earl Warren, and William H. Rehnquist,
served for enough years that the period is more or less defined by their stewardship,
at least in popular parlance. In some of these periods the Chief Justice had, or is
commonly perceived to have had, a decided influence on the direction of constitu-
tional law during that period. This is true of the Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist
eras, although an argument could be made that the Rehnquist Court built upon the
rulings of the Burger years, thus making it arbitrary to separate the two. However,
the Burger Court revolution, such as it was, was largely limited to criminal proce-
dure cases and holding the line on the use of the Equal Protection Clause in selected
30 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary
Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 569-70 (2003) (noting that the Rehnquist Court saw a
dramatic shift in the nature of cases decided, the number of cases decided, and the doctrinal
import of the cases decided after 1994).
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"social welfare" cases.3 The Rehnquist Court has left a distinct legacy, particularly,
although not exclusively, in federalism cases.2
Finally, and most importantly, the periods chosen largely, although not entirely,
correspond to temporal categories used by leading legal historians. For example,
Lawrence Baum splits his 1985 study of the Supreme Court into the pre-Marshall,
Marshall and Taney Courts, the period between 1865 and 1935, and the period from
1937 to 1985, which he subdivides into the Warren and Burger Courts.33 Robert
McCloskey's latest work, as revised by Sanford Levinson, is divided into six time
periods: 1789 to 1810 (the pre-Marshall years), 1810 to 1835 (the Marshall Court),
1836 to 1864 (The Taney Court), 1865 to 1900 (the "Guilded Age"), 1900 to 1937
(the "Judiciary and the Regulatory State"), and 1937 to 1959 (the "Modem
Court"). 34
The horizontal axis is self-explanatory. The first two categories (from left to
right) are the name of the case and its citation. The third category notes The
Federalist Papers cited. This category may, however, be under-inclusive. For
example, both Calder v. Bull35 and Fletcher v. Peck36 cited generally to The
Federalist but mentioned no one paper in particular. Sections of Marbury v.
Madison37 read like The Federalist No. 7838 without any attribution at all. And
much of the analysis in M'Culloch v. Marylandf9 reads like The Federalist Nos. 3340
and 44,41 again without specific attribution.42 Consequently there might be some
31 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Significant advances were, however, achieved in
expanding the Due Process Clause to include "family" rights not previously recognized. See,
e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
32 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
13 LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 18-24 (2d ed. 1985).
34 ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (revised by Sanford
Levinson, 3d ed. 2000). Professor Levinson added Chapters Eight and Nine, the former
analyzing civil rights and civil liberties cases and the latter exploring judicial monitoring of
the new welfare state. These two chapters are not organized according to time periods.
11 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798).
36 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 122 (1810).
" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-80 (1803).
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
31 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433-37 (1819).
40 THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
41 THE FEDERALISTNo. 44 (James Madison).
42 The reason for this has nothing to do with the unavailability of The Federalist Papers
during these early years. The Federalist Papers were first published, in hard-bound form, in
1788, a year after the Constitution was ratified. Moreover, The Federalist Papers were
frequently referred to in Congressional debates starting in the summer of 1789. Rakove,
supra note 17, at 235-40.
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inaccuracy, the amount of which is difficult to tell, in findings about the extent to
which various opinions and various Courts relied on The Federalist Papers and the
degree of that reliance. The remaining categories concern whether The Federalist
was cited in a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion, and which Justices cited it.
The most important category, the importance that the citing Justice attached to
The Federalist Papers cited, does not appear on the horizontal axis at all. This is
assessed in the text. The range of importance can vary from unimportant, to useful
as support for a textual or structural argument, to being important as explanatory of
ambiguous text, to determinative of a particular constitutional position, to every
nuanced degree of those possibilities.43 Sometimes it is easy to determine into
which category the citation falls, as it was in Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in
Printz.44  That, however, is the exception. Take, for example, Chief Justice
Marshall's nearly wholesale use of Publius's arguments in Marbury to establish the
principle of judicial review.45 One might say that The Federalist was not at all
important to the decision since it was not cited.4 6 It was merely "coincidental" in the
sense that both Marshall and Hamilton were Federalists and agreed that judicial
review was necessary both to protect the rule of law and to ensure the supremacy of
federal law. That is, the same result would have obtained even if The Federalist No.
78 had not been written.4 On the other hand, it is certainly possible, probably
likely, that The Federalist No. 78 significantly influenced Marshall's views on the
role of the Court and that those views led to the Court's unanimous decision that
both legislative and executive acts were subject to judicial oversight.48 Similarly,
it is difficult to determine the "true" importance of The Federalist to Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in Printz.49 Was it the contemporaneous congressional history that
decided the "original understanding" issue, making his extended citation of The
41 I tried and ultimately rejected a suggestion that I quantify, or at least objectify, the
importance of The Federalist Papers to each decision and code that objectification in the
appendix in a separate vertical column. Despite (or probably because of) the relative ease of
doing so, such an attempt, as explained above, would be less accurate and thus more
misleading than a textual description.
4 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 971 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In
deciding these cases, . . . it is The Federalist that finally determines my position.").
41 Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-79 (1803), with THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 78 at 505-08 (Alexander Hamilton).
4 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-79.
47 Cf. Larry D. Kramer, But When Exactly Was Judicially-Enforced Federalism "Born"
in the First Place?, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 123, 127-28 (1998); Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv.
215,247 & nn. 133-34 (2000) (asserting that hardly anyone even saw The Federalist 78 and
that Hamilton wrote it to rebut Brutus's assertion of "so sweeping a power on judges");
McGowan, supra note 17, at 756, 827-32.
48 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
49 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 910-15, 918-24.
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Federalist superfluous? 50 Were the two more or less equal in their importance? Or,
was Justice Scalia's extended recitation of The Federalist meant more to respond to
Justice Souter's dissent than to support the majority's arguments?5
So what exactly does this study measure? Clearly it cannot, at least not without
significant doubt, match the frequency of citation of The Federalist Papers (or any
other historical source) with its influence because, as discussed above, there is some
probability that the conclusions will be underinclusive. It is certainly plausible that
a Justice might have been influenced by historical materials (or any other materials)
without citing them. About the least one can do, and the only thing that this study
does, is to look at the relationship between the historical rise of The Federalist Papers
and their apparent influence. 2
The first was easy. The Federalist's apparent influence, however, is necessarily a
matter of judgment. Some judgments took little thought. Citations of The Federalist
appearing in a string of citations, either of multiple Papers or of Papers with other
material, historical or otherwise, were placed in the "uninfluential" category. Citations
of The Federalist preceded by a "see, e.g.," "cf.," or similar modifier were treated
likewise. Footnote citations had a presumptive unimportance to them that textual
citations did not, whereas references which quoted portions of The Federalist
Papers were more likely to be viewed as influential than was a declaratory sentence
followed by a simple reference to a particular paper. Most difficult to categorize
were (1) instances where The Federalist was cited for analytically essential but
largely background points and (2) opinions in which The Federalist was cited and
quoted but where it was only one relatively small part of a far larger historical
discussion containing other primary source material and case precedent. This paper
will attempt to explain the conclusions reached for each category.
The analysis will proceed as follows. Each time period will be discussed sepa-
rately. The raw data as to the number of cases during that period in which The
Federalist was cited, the specific papers cited, the Justices citing The Federalist
Papers, and the type of opinion citing The Federalist Papers will be presented. For
purposes of presentation, a plurality opinion has been categorized as a majority
opinion and an opinion which was a partial concurrence and a partial dissent has been
counted as a dissent. Each era will be compared to the one previous; this comparison
will include the number of cases citing The Federalist Papers, the kinds of opinions
in which the citations occurred, and the comparative citation patterns of Justices who
served during both periods. Finally, in most periods, particularly .those up to the
Warren Court, the citation patterns of Justices who cited The Federalist will be
described; although in the interest of time, space, use of virgin timber, and avoiding
rank boredom, not every opinion will be analyzed. The Appendix, however, will
50 Id. at 909-10.
Id. at911-15 &nn.7-9.
52 I thank my colleague Jessie Hill for reminding me of this important caveat.
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provide the basic information for those who wish to supplement the text. From the
Warren Court forward, analyzing every Justice who cited The Federalist proved
problematic. Some cited The Federalist Papers often; others cited them very infre-
quently. Those in the latter group will not be discussed individually, although their
opinions were checked in order to ensure that an opinion that relied significantly on
The Federalist was not overlooked.
Finally, the last section, Section IV, will draw some general conclusions about
the importance of The Federalist Papers to constitutional analysis and outcomes.
II. THE FACTUAL ANALYSIS
A. The Pre-Marshall and Marshall Years: 1789-1835
53
The first forty-six years of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence reveals
that references to The Federalist Papers appeared in twelve cases. Only one of those
cases, Calder v. Bull,54 was decided prior to 1800, when John Marshall became the
Chief Justice. At the end of an exhaustive effort to define an ex post facto law,"
Justice Chase noted that Blackstone defined ex post facto laws as Chase himself did
and that "[Blackstone's] opinion is confirmed.., by the author of The Federalist."6
It is impossible to tell the degree to which Justice Chase relied upon The Federalist
rather than his own understanding.
During the Marshall years, The Federalist Papers were noted in eleven cases
and thirteen opinions.5 Not all of these opinions mentioned The Federalist Papers
by number. For example, Justice Johnson's dissenting opinion in Fletcher v. Peck
referred generally to "letters of Publius. ' " In Cohens v. Virginia,9 Chief Justice
Marshall similarly referred to The Federalist Papers only in general language.6"
5' The Pre-Marshall and Marshall years have been combined because only one case in
the eleven years before John Marshall was appointed Chief Justice mentioned The Federalist
Papers.
14 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 391 (1798).
" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 3.
56 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
5' This does not include cases, such as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), in which the Court's reasoning resembles or is an exact replica of that used by
"Publius." See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
58 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 144 (1810) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
'9 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418-420 (1821).
60 Id. at 418-20. Marshall referred to The Federalist in only two other cases, M'Culloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431-33 (1819), and Weston v. City Council of
Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449,469 (1829). Like his citation in Cohens, these cases referred
to The Federalist generally and not by specific number. Moreover, in neither of the cases
were The Federalist Papers cited in any way that could conceivably be characterized as
crucial to the decision. Indeed in both M'Culloch and Weston, the only reason for citing The
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References to specific Papers appeared in only three majority opinions: The
Federalist No. 82 in Justice Washington's opinion in Houston v. Moore,6 Justice
Story's mention of The Federalist No. 42 in United States v. Smith,62 and his foot-
note reference to The Federalist No. 29 in Martin v. Mott.
63
Dissenters made far greater use of The Federalist Papers during this period than
did those who authored majority opinions, and when The Federalist Papers were
cited, they were specifically referenced. The Federalist appeared in seven dissenting
opinions, 54 percent of the opinions that mentioned The Federalist during that time
period. Of those 71 percent (five of seven) were authored by one Justice, Smith
Thompson. 64
Conclusions are difficult to come by with only fourteen opinions so much as
mentioning The Federalist Papers and only three being majority opinions. One
thing is clear, however. If viewed from what the Court and/or various Justices said,
The Federalist Papers played little role in the outcome of the cases. Citations in
majority opinions were little more than asides, if that.65 Even the dissenters did not
seem to give The Federalist any significant weight.66 Rather, they were used to
Federalist at all was that it had been cited by one of the parties to support their arguments.
M'Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433-35; Weston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 468-69.
61 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1,25-26 & n.a (1820) (raising the issue of congressional power to
punish).
62 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158-59 & n.a (1820). The question in Smith was whether the
United States could impose the death penalty for crimes committed on the high seas. Justice
Story's reference to The Federalist No. 42 concerned whether the laws of nations could be
used to define crimes on the high seas. Id. at 157-58 & n.a.
63 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31 n.1 (1827).
64 Justice Thompson is not exactly a household name. He was a Republican from New
York appointed by President Monroe in 1823. He died in office twenty years later in 1843.
Donald Malcolm Roper completed a biography of Justice Thompson in 1963 in partial
satisfaction of the requirements for a Ph.D. See Donald Malcolm Roper, Mr. Justice
Thompson and the Constitution, in AMERICAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: A
GARLAND SERIES OF OUTSTANDING DISSERTATIONS (Harold Human & Stuart Bruchey eds.,
1987). Included in this biography is an analysis of Thompson's disagreements with Marshall
on the scope of state powers to regulate commerce, state powers to tax items in commerce,
and government power to impinge on private property. Not coincidentally, these
disagreements are captured in the specific Federalist Papers cited, Nos. 32, 42, 43 and 44.
See id. at 121-205. The other two Justices who mentioned The Federalist were Justice
Johnson, in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 144 (1810) (Johnson, J., dissenting), and
Justice Trimble (also not a household name) in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213,
329 (1827) (Trimble, J., dissenting).
65 As noted above, two of the three citations of The Federalist by Justice Marshall
occurred only because they were briefed and argued by the party who, incidentally, ended
up losing the case. See supra note 60.
66 See, e.g., Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 144 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing only to
the "letters of Publius").
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confirm the conclusions reached by more normative structural principles or by
reference to such common law giants as Blackstone.67 There was certainly nothing
remotely resembling the debate between Justices Scalia and Souter in Print.
61
B. The Pre-Civil War Period to the End of the Civil War: 1835-1865
For all but the last year of this period, Roger B. Taney was the Chief Justice. 9
During his tenure, references to The Federalist Papers nearly doubled, from twelve
cases in the forty-six years that made up the Marshall and pre-Marshall years to
nineteen in the thirty-year period from 1835 to 1865. And the number of opinions
in which The Federalist appeared also increased by fifty-eight percent, going from
thirteen in the previous period to twenty-four in this period. Moreover the speci-
ficity of the citations also increased. In only three of the twenty-four opinions (12.5
percent) were The Federalist Papers referred to without specific reference; all the
other opinions mentioned particular Papers. In contrast to the Marshall years, eight
of the twenty-four opinions (33 percent) were majority opinions and three were
concurring opinions. In other words, 46 percent of the references supported or
purportedly supported the Court's disposition. Finally, of the twenty-one Justices
who served during this period, thirteen (62 percent) at one time or another cited The
Federalist. This contrasts with the preceding period during which only seven of the
seventeen justices (41 percent) even made mention of The Federalist Papers.
The Federalist appeared in some notable cases during this period: Mayor ofNew
York v. Miln,70 Luther v. Borden,71 Cooley v. Board of Wardens,72 The Passenger
Cases,73 Prigg v. Pennsylvania,74 and Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 to name a few. Ten
of the twenty-one cases in which The Federalist Papers were cited (48 percent)
involved the question raised, but left open, in Gibbons v. Ogden:76 whether powers
granted to the federal government by Article I, Section 8 are exclusive or can they
be shared concurrently by the states.77 The remaining eleven cases in which The
67 As Professor McGowan argued, The Federalist Papers may well have been important
for another reason: to establish ajudicial "ethos." See McGowan, supra note 17, at 757-58.
68 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
69 Justice Taney, maybe rightfully so, will undoubtedly be forever remembered for his
ill-advised and unsuccessful attempt to save the Union from the bench. Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (9 How.) 393 (1856); see also note 105 and accompanying text.
70 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 102 (1837).
71 48 U.S. (7 How.)1 (1849).
72 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
71 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
74 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
7' 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
76 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
77 Gillman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 568 (1852); Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 99; The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
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Federalist Papers were cited covered the waterfront, from states allegedly impairing
the obligation of contracts,"8 to the jurisdiction of federal courts, 79 to the President's
removal power.80 All of the cases mentioned involved issues that were to one degree
or another discussed in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 and in the state
ratification conventions thereafter, the very issues to which The Federalist Papers
were devoted. It might be thought, then, that The Federalist Papers were influential
in deciding these disputes and that the Justices who cited them relied upon them in
some significant way. Not so.
Justice Woodbury cited The Federalist Papers in the greatest number of
opinions, four. Justice Campbell claimed three, and Justices McLean, Story, Curtis,
Daniel, Catron, and Chief Justice Taney cited The Federalist in two opinions each.
However, none of the Justices who cited The Federalist relied on it to make their
points. The closest that one can come to even suggesting that The Federalist Papers
played a significant part in a Justice's analysis was Justice Daniel's dissenting
opinion in the Passenger Cases.8' Citing The Federalist No. 32, Justice Daniels
argued that the Constitution, as understood by those who ratified it, retained the
states' taxing power as it was prior to 1789.82 With respect to the more general issue
of the Congress's exclusive authority to regulate alien migration to the United
States, Justice Daniel cited The Federalist No. 428" to refute the claim that the
Constitution gave Congress the exclusive authority to regulate immigration after
1808.' Yet despite his apparent reliance on The Federalist Papers, he devoted only
283; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S.(5 How.) 504 (1847); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 441 (1847); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 Howard) 410 (1847); Kendall v. United States
ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. (I 1 Pet.) 257
(1837); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
78 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855); Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S.
(6 How.) 301 (1848).
71 Jacksonv. Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857); Floridav. Georgia, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
8 United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1854).
81 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,494-518 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting). These cases (one from
New York and the other from Massachusetts) involved the ability of the states to restrict, by
per capita taxation or outright exclusion, the entry of aliens intothe country.
82 Id. at 503-04.
83 The Federalist No. 42 discusses the power of the federal government to control "the
intercourse with foreign nations", including Article I, Section 2 cl. 1, prohibiting Congress
from interfering with the importation of slaves until 1808. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, 270,
272-73 (James Madison).
8 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 511-14 (Daniel, J., dissenting). Justice
Daniel's argument, simply stated, was that one could not imply from the prohibition in
Article I, Section 9 the exclusive power of the federal government to regulate alien
immigration. Who could enter a state was, before 1808, a matter for the states to determine
and that did not change after that year.
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about a page and a half of a twenty-three-page opinion to a discussion of The
Federalist.85
The references by the other Justices were far more cursory, citing The Federalist
almost as an afterthought. Justice Woodbury who cited The Federalist Papers in
more opinions (four) than any other Justice is an example. In Waring v. Clarke,86
a case questioning whether federal admiralty jurisdiction extended to waters beyond
"the high seas,"87 Justice Woodbury cited The Federalist Nos. 80 and 83 but devotes
only a sentence to each, even though his opinion was thirty-four pages long.88
Similarly in Planters' Bank v. Sharp,89 a Contract Clause9° case, he devoted about
one sentence of a sixteen page opinion to demonstrate the point that to pass a law
impairing the obligation of contracts not only violated the Constitution, but also
would be "contrary to the first principles of the social compact."' His forty-eight-
page dissenting opinion in Luther v. Borden92 referred to several of The Federalist
Papers: Nos. 77,93 44,94 and 29," but these references were hardly central to his
arguments. Rather, they appear in a form equivalent to the modem day string of
citations. The same is true of Justice Woodbury's citations to The Federalist in his
dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases.9 6 Indeed, only one of those citations
97
mentions a particular paper, No. 82, and that was contained in parentheses along
with the citation of a case, Holmes v. Jennison.98 Admittedly there is no necessary,
conclusive, or direct relationship between the space devoted to a discussion of The
Federalist (when compared to the larger analysis) and its impact on the case, but at
the very least the burden would shift to those who would assert that relatively scant
attention to The Federalist Papers says little about their importance to the analysis
or the outcome.
8Id. at 503-04, 511.
86 46 U.S. (6 How.) 441 (1847).
87 Id. at 488.
81 Id. at 488, 493.
89 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301 (1848).
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
9' Planters'Bank, 47 U.S. (6. How.) at 319.
92 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 48-88 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
9' Id. at 53 (supporting the Courts' role as the intermediary between the people and the
legislature).
94 Id. at 70 (arguing that martial law, even more than a bill of attainder, violates the social
compact).
9' Id. at 77 (arguing that the President, not the organs of state government, is the judge
of the force necessary to suppress an insurrection).
96 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 554-55 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 554.
98 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
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I will mention only two other Justices, Chief Justice Taney and Justice Daniels.99
Taney cited The Federalist No. 38 in Dred Scott for the proposition (referring to the
validity of the Missouri Compromise) that "the acquisition of the Northwestern
Territory by the confederated States [was] ... dangerous to the liberties of the
people."'" Of course the Chief Justice followed this with "[w]e do not mean,
however, to question the power of Congress in this respect. The power to expand
the territory of the United States ... is plainly given."'' Hardly a dispositive cite.
Chief Justice Taney's dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases cites to The
Federalist No. 32, 42, and generally to "several of the preceding numbers" (those
preceding No. 32)."2 He cited these Papers for precisely the same points that
Justice Daniels cited them in his dissenting opinion, to establish that Congress did
not have exclusive authority to regulate the immigration of aliens into the country
and that the states did not lose any of their pre-constitutional authority to levy taxes.
Unlike Justice Daniels, however, the Chief Justice did not devote nearly the time
that Justice Daniels did, especially to The Federalist No. 32.103 True, Justice Taney
delved more deeply into The Federalist No. 42 and the question of whether the
states gave up any of their authority to tax by reason of federal authority over
immigration, an element of foreign affairs powers.'"4 Indeed, it might be argued that
Taney, much like Daniels, relied quite heavily on The Federalist No. 46 in order to
make his constitutional point. It is a close call.
Be that as it may, the general conclusion that The Federalist Papers played a
marginal role at best in either determining the outcome of any case in which they
were mentioned or even played a significant role in how the Justices reached their
conclusions during this period still stands. Even accepting that Justice Daniels and
Chief Justice Taney relied on The Federalist Papers to a significant degree, that
represents only two of the twenty-five opinions (eight percent) in which The
Federalist Papers were cited.
9 To analyze each Justice who cited The Federalist during this period would be useful
only to insomniacs, not only because it would be tedious but also because the conclusion
about the importance of The Federalist to the Justices' analysis would not change. The
appendix lists the other cases and the Justices who cited The Federalist. It is important,
however, to look at these particular Justices. Chief Justice Taney was selected largely
because he was the Chief Justice and he was decidedly "originalist" (to use a modem term)
in his interpretative methodology. Justice Daniels is mentioned because his dissenting
opinion in the Passenger Cases complements that of the Chief Justice.lOO DredScott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,447 (1857).
Oi Id. Chief Justice Taney then went on to say that while the federal government has the
right to acquire new territory and determine when it is ready for statehood, the judiciary must
determine the rights of individuals to their property according to "the provisions and
principles of the Constitution." Id.
102 Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 479 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
103 Compare id. at 471, 479 (Taney, C.J., dissenting), with id. at 503-04 (Daniels, J.,
dissenting).
'04 Id. at 474-75 (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
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This is not to say that what we today describe as originalism was unimportant
during this period. Quite the opposite is true. As Chief Justice Taney said in his major-
ity opinion in Dred Scott:
No one . . . supposes that any change in public opinion...
should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution
a more liberal construction... than they were intended to bear
when the instrument was framed and adopted.... [I]t speaks not
only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent
with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers,
and was voted on and adopted by the people .... Any other...
construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court,
and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of
the day. This court was not created.., for such purposes. °5
A brief scan of the opinions of the Court in this era bore out that the Court, to a
Justice, believed what Taney said about the importance of adhering to what the
Framers understood to be the meaning of the words they used. The "living
Constitution" was as foreign a concept to the Justices in this era as the justification
for treating those of African descent as non-persons is to us today. Nevertheless, in
determining what the Framers meant by the words they used, The Federalist Papers
played little role.) °6 Far more important were the common law and practice, both
here and in England and in the Colonies and States during the Confederation, and
judicial precedent.0 7 Except as just another scholarly opinion,' °8 The Federalist
Papers hardly appeared on the radar screen.
C. Reconstruction to the Turn of the Century: 1865-1900
In the thirty-five years between 1865 and 1900, the Court had three Chief Justices:
Salmon P. Chase, Morrison R. Waite, and Melville W. Fuller.' 9 It was during this
'os DredScott, 60 U.S. at 426. See also Sources ofFederalism, supra note 16. Originalism
was the "principal ... mode of constitutional interpretation" from 1789 through the middle
of the nineteenth century. Id at 233.
106 See McGowan, supra note 17, at 756, 827-32.
107 Id.
See id. at 755,840.
109 Chief Justice Chase was appointed in 1864 to fill the vacancy created by Chief Justice
Taney's death in that year and served for ten years until 1874 when he too died while in
office. Chase was succeeded by Morrison Waite, who served until 1888. Both Justices were
sitting at the time of their appointment. Chase also died in office, replaced by Melville Fuller.
Fuller was to follow the pattern of his two predecessors, dying in office in 1910. Unlike the
previous periods, none of the three Chief Justices, whatever their administrative or legal
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period that the Court had to grapple with the breadth of federal authority, both
judicial and legislative, created by the newly enacted Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments."' It was also during this period that the Court decided Hans
v. Louisiana,"' the case that laid the groundwork for the Court's current Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence." 2 Furthermore, the Court in 1895 struck down the first
federal attempt to tax income," 3 paving the way for the Sixteenth Amendment." 4
This was the period that set the stage for the now discredited "Lochner era.""1
5
Statistically, the number of cases in which Justices cited The Federalist Papers
increased during this period, going from twenty-one cases in the previous thirty-five
years to twenty-six over the same number of years. While numerically negligible,
that represents a 24 percent increase. The number of opinions, as opposed to cases,
citing The Federalist Papers also increased in this period compared to the previous
era, going from twenty-five to twenty-eight, a 12 percent increase. But of the
twenty-six Justices who served during this period, only twelve (46 percent) cited
The Federalist Papers. That compares to 62 percent (thirteen of twenty-one) of the
Justices who served during the previous period and 41 percent during the period
from 1787 to 1835.
Comparing the more qualitative aspects of the statistics, citations appeared in
twenty-one majority opinions (78 percent of the opinions), five dissenting opinions
(18 percent) and one concurring opinion (approximately 4 percent). The percentage
of citations in majority opinions represents a substantial increase from the previous
period when The Federalist appeared in majority opinions only 34.6 percent of the
time. One might conclude from this not only that the raw number of citations
increased but that the influence of The Federalist on the Court's decisions increased
skills, had the same defining influence during their tenure as did Chief Justices Marshall or
Taney. Put another way, the period between 1865 and 1900 is not defined by the Chief
Justice as were the two previous periods and subsequent periods such as the "Warren Court"
or the "Rehnquist Court." This difference prompts a temporal division based on social history
rather than the tenure of a Chief Justice. See McClosky, supra note 34.
"o See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (congressional power); Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (substantive scope of section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
" 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
12 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment prevents Congress from creating rights to private claims against states).
"' Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), aft'don rehearing, 158
U.S. 601 (1895).
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
"' Court decisions toward the end of this period foreshadow the rebuke of state powers
that characterizes the Lochner era. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)
(striking down state law prohibiting writing property insurance by out-of-state corporation
on liberty of contract grounds); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890) (holding unconstitutional a state statute authorizing the setting of rail rates).
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as well, despite the precipitous decline in the number of the Justices who thought
that The Federalist provided guidance. This assumption will be tested below.
Another statistical indicator of the significance of The Federalist Papers to the
outcome might be the specificity of the citation, that is, whether the reference was
generally to "The Federalist Papers" or to a specific paper. Twenty-four of the
twenty-eight opinions (86 percent) referred to specific Papers.'6
To assess the importance of The Federalist to the outcomes of the cases in
which it was cited, only those opinions in which the references appeared in the
majority opinions were reviewed. Because these references comprised 75 percent
of the opinions, this gives a pretty good gauge of the Court's use of The Federalist
Papers during this period.l 7 In addition, the analysis focuses on those Justices who
cited The Federalist Papers in three or more opinions. They were Chief Justice
Fuller and Justice Swayne (four citations each), and Justices Clifford, Field, Gray,
and Miller (three each)." 8 The statistics, however, belie the insignificant role that
The Federalist Papers played, even in the opinions of those Justices most prone to
cite them. With the exception of three cases, The Federalist Papers played a role
that ranged from inconsequential to marginal.
Oddly enough, those Justices who cited The Federalist most often in majority
opinions, Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Swayne, seemed the least influenced either
by its content or its persuasive authority. This was particularly true of Justice
Swayne. In two of the cases, Swayne cited The Federalist Papers in footnotes;' 19
in a third case he noted The Federalist Papers in a "see also" cite; 20 another citation
simply demonstrated that The Federalist Papers gave no aid in distinguishing a
direct tax from an indirect tax.'2'
The Federalist seems to have had somewhat more significance to Chief Justice
Fuller, but barely, as even that appears to be limited to one case. In the opinion after
rehearing in Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co.,122 the Chief Justice noted some
conflict between Hamilton's position in The Federalist Nos. 30 and 36 on the federal
"6 Four opinions contained both a general reference to The Federalist and a citation to
specific Papers. For purposes of the statistics cited in the text, these cases are included in the
specific citation group because specific references more strongly suggest The Federalist
Papers themselves, rather than some more generalized description of original understanding,
influenced the outcome of a given case.
"' I also looked briefly at the other opinions to ensure that they substantiate my
conclusions.
18 Chief Justice Chase and Justice Bradley each cited The Federalist Papers twice, while
Justices Strong, Brown, Harlan, and Nelson cited The Federalist Papers once each.
" Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. 433, 445 n.* (1868); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S.
713, 730 n.* (1865).
120 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 606 (1877).
121 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1880).
12 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (holding the federal income tax unconstitutional, which prompted
the proposal and final ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment).
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power to tax individual income and his position in some of his later writings.'23 He
resolved the conflict in favor of The Federalist.'24 On the other hand, Fuller's
reliance on The Federalist occupied at most three paragraphs of an extensive,
twenty-page assessment of the original understanding of the scope of the federal
taxing power."' Indeed, in the first Pollock opinion,'26 the Chief Justice cited The
Federalist on four pages of the thirty-two page opinion,'27 but he cites it for two
unexceptional propositions: (1) that the states did not lose their power to tax by
reason of the grant of taxing authority to the federal government; 2 ' and (2) eluci-
dating the reasons for the proportional tax requirement of Article I, Section 9,
Clause 4 of the Constitution. 29 Chief Justice Fuller's references to The Federalist
in the two other cases in which he referred to it were merely window dressing. 30
There were only two other Justices, Clifford and Bradley, for whom The Federalist
seemed to hold any significant substantive weight, but these too were limited to one
case. In his majority opinion in Scholey v. Rew,' Clifford appeared influenced by
The Federalist No. 36, despite the fact that the discussion of The Federalist occupied
only one paragraph. 3 2 However, there is no consistency to Justice Clifford's reliance
on The Federalist. In an extensive, twenty-seven-page concurring opinion in Hall
v. DeCuir,'33 Clifford mentioned The Federalist only once, on the next to last page. '34
Furthermore, in his majority opinion in Transportation Company v. Wheeling'35
there was a reference to The Federalist No. 32 but it was preceded by the phrase
"[s]upport to that view is also derived from." '136 The importance of this citation is
questionable and, in any event, hardly decisive.
123 Id. at 624-26.
124 Id. at 627.
125 Id. at 622-27.
126 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
127 Id. at 558-59, 560-62, 564.
128 Id. at 558-59. The Court had already decided this proposition in M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
129 Id. at 560, 564.
130 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892) (citing The Federalist No. 68 in a string
of other citations); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108 (1890).
131 90U.S. 331 (1874).
132 Id. at 348 (questioning whether a succession [estate] tax on property was a direct tax
and thus denied to the federal government).
133 95 U.S. 485,491-517 (1877) (Clifford, J., concurring). In Hall, the Court struck down
a Louisiana statute that prohibited racial discrimination on public carriers operating out of
Louisiana, even those like the plaintiff's that operated in interstate commerce, because the
statute violated the Commerce Clause.
114 Id. at 516.
131 99 U.S. 273 (1878).
136 Id. at 280.
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The same can be said of the second Justice, Justice Bradley. In the now famous
case of Hans v. Louisiana,137 Bradley relied upon Hamilton's The Federalist No. 81 to
bolster his argument that the Framers never intended that federal jurisdiction extend to
suits against a state where the state had not consented thereto. 38 Was The Federalist
No. 81 decisive, i.e., necessary to his decision? Probably not. Bradley also relied on
Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia,39 on the rapid and vociferous reaction
to Chisholm,"4 on the counterfactual assumption that the Constitution would never
have been ratified had it been clear that citizens could sue the states without the states'
consent,'4 ' and on the anomaly that in-state citizens could sue their own state in federal
court but out-of-state citizens could not.42 Nevertheless, the citation to The Federalist
No. 81 was the only bit of solid, documentary historical evidence that Justice Bradley
cited. As such, one can only assume that it played an influential role in the Hans
decision. 4 3 Like Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Clifford, however, Justice Bradley
gave no indication in the only other opinion in which he cited The Federalist that
it held any particular interpretative prominence. " The other Justices who cited The
Federalist Papers seemed even less influenced by them.'45
Does one conclude then that original understanding was unimportant either to
the Justices who cited The Federalist or, more generally, to the Court of this era?
Not at all. Like the previous period, in all of the cases in which Justices cited The
Federalist some understanding of what the Framers meant by the language used was
utmost in the Justices' minds. In reaching such an understanding, however, The
Federalist Papers were apparently not deemed particularly helpful.
'3 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
3 Id. at 12-14.
'3 Id. at 12 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
140 Id. at 12.
141 Id. at 10-11.
142 Id. at 10.
141 Professor McGowan argues that it should not have because it is contrary to Hamilton's
general philosophy on Federalism. McGowan, supra note 17, at 758.
'44 Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 138 (1876) (using The Federalist as one of several
parts of the historical record, including the Judiciary Act and prior cases that bore on the
question of whether federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy claims).
'41 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 135 (1868) (Miller, J.) (citing
Federalist No. 42 for additional support); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. (10 Otto.) 399, 412
(1879) (Field, J.) (citing Federalist No. 42 in addition to direct case support); Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265,289 (1888) (Gray, J.) (citing Federalist No. 80 in a string of
citations).
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D. The Era of "Judicial Deregulation ": 1900-193 7146
The period between 1900 and 1937, the year in which President Franklin
Roosevelt appointed his first Supreme Court justice, 147 is often referred to as the
Lochner148 era, a period when the Court struck down numerous state and federal
regulations because they interfered with contractual and property rights. 49 It was
also a time in which the Court frustrated congressional attempts to regulate the
national economy under the Commerce Clause.15 The Federalist Papers played a
surprisingly, maybe shockingly, minor role in the outcome of the cases during this
era, less so than in the previous period of time.
This period includes two more years than the previous two periods, thirty-seven
as opposed to thirty-five. Yet the number of cases in which The Federalist Papers
were cited decreased from twenty-eight in the previous years to seventeen during
these years, a 37 percent decrease. Obviously, the number of opinions in which
Justices cited The Federalist Papers also decreased significantly, going from thirty
in the previous era to twenty during this period, a 33 percent decrease. Finally, only
seven of the twenty-five Justices (a mere 28 percent) cited The Federalist compared
to sixteen during the previous period, a 56 percent decrease.
Of the twenty opinions that cited The Federalist Papers, fifteen (75 percent)
were majority opinions and five (25 percent) were dissenting opinions. No concur-
ring opinions cited The Federalist Papers. Moreover, every opinion that cited The
Federalist did so specifically; there were no general references to "Publius," the
"The Federalist Papers," etc. Finally, seven of the twenty opinions (35 percent)
contained multiple citations to specific Federalist Papers, the most being in Justice
McReynolds's dissent in Myers v. United States.'
51
146 The description is largely mine although Professor Baum describes this period as one
dealing largely with issues of economic regulation. Baum, supra note 33, at 20-22.
14' That appointee was Hugo L. Black, who served on the Court from 1937 until his
retirement in 1971 at age 85.
148 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding unconstitutional a state regulationof
employment in bakeries).
149 Like all generalizations, this is not universally true. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding Minnesota's mortgage foreclosure
moratorium against a Contract Clause and Fourteenth Amendment challenge).
s0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936);
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918). But see Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport
Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Hipolite Egg
Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S.
321 (1903).
... 272 U.S. 52, 186, 203, 208, 229, 235 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Justice
McReynolds cited five Papers in his dissent.
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One might conclude, based on the above statistics alone, that, as a qualitative
as well as quantitative matter, the importance of The Federalist Papers to decisions
in this era was less than in any period other than the first period studied. To test
that, I reviewed all of the opinions citing The Federalist Papers during this era.
Textual discussion, however, will be limited only to those Justices who cited
The Federalist Papers two or more times. These were Chief Justices Fuller (two
citations) 52 and Hughes (three) and Justices Sutherland (five) and McReynolds
(three).'53 In addition, particular attention is devoted to Myers because it is the case
in which Justice Sutherland cited to five different Federalist Papers, because of
Myers' importance to separation of powers jurisprudence even today,154 and because
of the extensive analysis given to original understanding by all of the opinions in the
case.
Chief Justice Fuller, who served for ten of the thirty-seven year period, cited The
Federalist Papers twice. This is not in itself terribly significant. When combined
with the four times he cited them in the previous period it might seem that The
Federalist Papers were important to his interpretation of original understanding, but
that is not true. In his dissent in Dooley v. United States,' a case testing the con-
stitutionality of congressional legislation, he cited The Federalist to demonstrate
that states can't levy import or export duties.'56 And in Hanover National Bank v.
Moyses, ' The Federalist No. 42 was mentioned in a string of other citations. 5 The
same conclusion holds for Justices McReynolds and Chief Justice Hughes, each
having cited The Federalist Papers in three of their opinions. Leaving aside for the
moment McReynolds's dissent in Myers, his citations to The Federalist in Newberry
v. United States,'59 as part of a string of citations, I6° and in Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota 61 give no indication that The Federalist in any way was important
to establishing his position.
152 Although Chief Justice Fuller only cited The Federalist Papers twice in the ten years
he served during this period, when combined with his citations in the previous period it is
apparent that he found The Federalist Papers of some importance in explaining our
constitutional structure.
153 The other two members of the "four horsemen," Justices Van Devanter and Butler,
never cited The Federalist Papers in any of the opinions they wrote during this period. Given
their position on federalism issues, one might find this somewhat surprising.
' See generally Jonathan L. Entin, Separation ofPowers, the Political Branches, and the
Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1990).
5 183 U.S. 151 (1901).
156 Id. at 169-70 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
157 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
158 Id. at 187.
159 256 U.S. 232 (1921). Newberry involved the question of whether two states could
impose an inheritance tax on the same corpus.
160 Id. at 248.
161 280 U.S. 204, 209 (1930).
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Evaluating the citations of Chief Justice Hughes is somewhat more complicated,
but only because of one case, Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi. 162 The other
two cases, however, suggest that Hughes attached no particular importance to
The Federalist Papers. Burnet v. Brooks163 refers to The Federalist No. 7 because
Justice McReynolds cited it in Farmers Loan & Trust.'64 Even in Home Building
& Loan Ass 'n v. Blaisdell,16' Hughes cited The Federalist No. 7 in a footnote, as part
of a string of citations,66 and cited The Federalist No. 44 only to illustrate the state
abuses that led to the enactment of the Contract Clause. i67 I do not, although one
certainly might, reach a different conclusion with regard to Hughes's citation of The
Federalist No. 81,168 if not The Federalist No. 80,169 in Monaco. Hughes cited The
Federalist No. 81 twice to refute the argument that the states had waived sovereign
immunity by joining the union, 70 the so-called "Plan Waiver" exception to the
Eleventh Amendment.' 7' The reason I am unconvinced that The Federalist was
particularly important to the decision in Monaco is that Hughes spent the largest
share of his opinion arguing that Hans v. Louisiana decided this case. 72 This
includes the reliance that Hans placed on the "profound shock theory" to explain
why states did not waive their sovereign immunity. 73 Certainly Hughes thought that
Hans was correctly decided, but it is unclear the extent to which Hans relied upon
The Federalist to buttress its conclusion.
Finally, there is Justice Sutherland, who cited The Federalist Papers in more
opinions than any other Justice who served during this period. Is that an indication
that he believed The Federalist Papers to be influential in interpreting the history
of the Constitution? Hardly. In two of his opinions, Sutherland cited The Federalist
Papers as one authority in a string of citations, 7 4 and in two cases he noted The
162 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
163 288 U.S. 378 (1933).
'64 Id. at 401.
16' 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
166 Id. at 427.
167 Id. at 427 & n.7.
168 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-25 (1934).
169 Id. at 328. The Federalist No. 80 was one of two citations that Hughes made without
any analysis as supporting the preceding textual statement concerning jurisdiction of the
federal courts in controversies between states. Id.
170 Id. at 322-23, 324.
171 See generally MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 99-103 (2002).
172 292 U.S. at 325-30. For a discussion of the importance of The Federalist Papers to the
Hans decision, see supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
173 Explaining the "profound shock theory" in sufficient detail to be meaningful would be
distracting. For an explanation, see 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 96-98 (1923).
17' Exparte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302, 304 (1925); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,
481 (1923).
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Federalist No. 48 only because it appeared in a portion of a Treatise by Justice Story
that he quoted.' In his dissent in Blaisdell, Sutherland quoted The Federalist Nos.
7 and 44 for precisely the same point as did the majority, background of state abuses
that led to the Contract Clause. 17 6 Finally, while Justice Sutherland's citation of The
Federalist Nos. 78 and 79 in O'Donoghue'77 has some importance in establishing
that the Founders believed that power over subsistence equates to power over will,
the deciding factor in Sutherland's judgment that Congress could not reduce a sitting
or retired federal judge's salary was the pattern and practice of Congress itself.17 1
Turning to the broader question of how the Court during this period viewed the
significance of The Federalist Papers to constitutional interpretation, Myers v.
United States 79 may provide the best clue. In analyzing whether the President could
remove executive officers who had been appointed with the advice and consent of
the Senate' without the concurrence of the Senate, Myers, in its various opinions,
occupies two hundred forty-four pages of the United States Reports, most of these
pages exploring original understanding. Chief Justice Taft, consistent with his
approach one year earlier in Exparte Grossman, 1 cited The Federalist Papers only
once in a seventy-seven-page opinion. 8' Immediately after citing The Federalist
No. 77, Taft expressly disclaimed any reliance upon it because Hamilton, its author,
had, in the Chief Justice'sjudgment, changed his mind. 3 For this he cited Hamilton's
writings after The Federalist No. 77.'84 Justice Brandeis cited The Federalist No.
77 as supporting the necessity of Senate consent to remove the officer in question,
185
but it was only one phrase, not even a sentence, out of a fifty-five-page opinion
devoted entirely to historical understanding and practice.
17' Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S 602, 630 (1935); see also
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S 516, 531 (1933) (same). Justice Story made exten-
sive use of The Federalist Papers in his 1833 constitutional treatise. See, e.g., 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 7, 1-44 (1833)
(discussing separation ofpowers and legislative structure). See generally Rakove, supra note
17, at 245-47.
176 290 U.S. at 463-64.
17 289 U.S. 516,531 (1933). The issue in O 'Donoghue was congressional power to reduce
the compensation of federal judges.
178 Id. at 548.
179 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
180 See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
181 267 U.S. 87 (1925). Grossman involved the question of whether the President could
grant reprieves to those convicted of criminal contempt of court. Id. In an extensive opinion
devoted almost entirely to determining what the Framers thought about this question, Chief
Justice Taft made no mention of The Federalist Papers.
182 Myers, 272 U.S. at 136-37.
183 Id at 137-39.
184 Id.
"s5 Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 14:243
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
Justice McReynolds wrote a sixty-one-page dissent which, like the other opinions,
focused on historical understanding. Although he cited five different Federalist
Papers, no citation seemed to be of much consequence. His citation to The Federalist
No. 74I ' seems almost an afterthought. His general citation to The Federalist"7
appears only because he quotes from Chancellor Kent who refers to The Federalist.
And he cited The Federalist No. 68 because it referred to a document drafted by
Jefferson, from which McReynolds quoted.' Similarly, McReynolds cited to The
Federalist No. 64 for the unexceptional proposition that federal power is limited8 9 and
his citation to The Federalist No. 66 appears only because he claimed, without much
analysis, that it supported a quoted argument by a Congressman Stone during a 1787
congressional debate. 0 Only his citation to The Federalist No. 76 seems to directly
support his substantive argument.' But to say that McReynolds relied upon The
Federalist No. 76, much less to argue that it was a significant spoke in his analytical
wheel, is a stretch, to say the least. Even if The Federalist No. 76 was important to
Justice McReynolds' determination in Myers that Senate approval was needed before
the President could remove an officer once confirmed by that body, given his other
citations and their lack of importance to his outcomes in Myers and his other opinions,
it is hard to argue that The Federalist Papers held much significance to him. Indeed,
what stands out about the Court's use of The Federalist during this period is that its
importance paled in comparison to that of other evidence of the Framers' understand-
ing of the Constitution's language and structure, most particularly the debates and
actions of the First Congress and the course of conduct of subsequent Congresses and
Presidents.
E. The "Roosevelt Court": 193 7-1954192
The citations to The Federalist Papers increased significantly during the
"Roosevelt Court" years despite the fact that this period covered twenty fewer years
than the previous period.' 93 The Federalist Papers appeared, in one way or another,
186 Id. at 186.
7 Id. at 203.
188 Myers, 272 U.S. at 235.
189 Id. at 229.
190 Id. at 237.
191 Id. at 208. Although No. 76 does contain language that would support Senate
concurrence with a removal, it does not suggest that such concurrence need be formal
consent, as with an appointment. THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
'92 It is certainly not improper to characterize the Court during these years as the
"Roosevelt Court." Franklin Delano Roosevelt served as President for over three terms, in
which he appointed an unsurpassed nine Justices to the Supreme Court. When he died in
1945, eight of the nine sitting Justices were his appointees. Only Justice Roberts was
appointed prior to 1937.
'9' The statistical relevance of this fact is questionable. For purposes of this paper, I did
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in twenty-six cases, a 53 percent increase. They also appeared in twenty-eight
opinions, a 40 percent increase. Somewhat surprising is that only twelve of the
twenty-eight opinions (43 percent) were majority opinions. Four were concurring
opinions and eleven (39 percent) were dissents. In the previous period (1900-1937),
75 percent were majority opinions, as well as 75 percent in the period previous to that
(1865-1900). At first blush, one might find the increased use of The Federalist
Papers during this period unexceptional, as the Court moved from a restrictive inter-
pretation of federal authority under the Commerce Clause to one that gave Congress
significantly more leeway to manage a national economy.'94 Historical justifications
might then seem appropriate both for those who found greater regulatory authority and
those who preferred the status quo, but only three of the dissenting opinions fit that
explanation.'95 Only one other case raising the scope of Congress's economic
regulatory authority cited The Federalist, and that was by Justice Black in a majority
opinion.' 96 As it turns out, The Federalist Papers were cited most often by Justices
Douglas (six opinions), Black (five opinions), and Frankfurter (four opinions). Justice
Black's five opinions cite seventeen different Federalist Papers, more than any other
Justice who had cited The Federalist Papers up to 1953.97 Justice Douglas was not
far behind, with eleven different Federalist Papers cited in the five opinions noted.
A review of the cases reveals, however, that the frequency of citations to The
Federalist Papers or the number of papers cited in any one opinion is not
necessarily an indication of the significance of The Federalist Papers either to the
Justice's analysis or to the Court's ultimate disposition. The analysis begins with
Justice Douglas, since he cited The Federalist in more opinions than any other
Justice during this period. Next Justice Black's citations will be examined.
Particular attention will be devoted to his majority opinion in South-Eastern
Underwriters, in which he cited seven different Papers.'98 This section will
not think it necessary to compare the number of written opinions during the two periods (or
any two periods for that matter) or to compare the number of cases in each period in which
the meaning ofthe unamended 1787 Constitution might have been an issue and thus citations
to The Federalist might be expected. That comparison is better left to another day and to
others more skilled in quantitative analysis.
19 Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), with Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942).
"' O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 283-99 (1939) (Butler, J., dissenting);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 646 (1937) (McReynolds, J. dissenting); Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 599-609 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
196 United States v. South-EastemUnderwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). South-Eastern
Underwriters is discussed in more detail below. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
197 So much for intuition based on stereotype. Justice Black's judicial philosophy was
decidedly positivist. His interpretive methodology was one of strict adherence to text.
HOWARD BALL, THE VISION AND THE DREAM OF JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK: AN EXAMINATION
OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 10 (1975).See infra note 214.
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conclude with an examination of Justice Frankfurter's opinions because he had the
next most citations with four. 99
Of the six cases in which Justice Douglas cited The Federalist Papers, only three
were majority opinions: District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.,2°° Richfield
Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization,2"' and United States v. Pink.2 °2 In none of
these opinions did The Federalist Papers cited appear to have any particular impor-
tance to the analysis. In Pink, Douglas cited The Federalist No. 64 only to bolster the
argument that executive authority was equal in status to that of the Congress and
judiciary.23 The citation to The Federalist No. 42 in Richfield Oil was even less
significant; it was an "and see" citation following a quoted statement by Madison in
the Virginia Ratification Convention.2°4 Finally, in John R. Thompson, The Federalist
No. 43 was part of a string of citations.2"5 To the extent history was significant at all
to Justice Douglas's opinion, it was significant as a statement by Madison at the
Virginia Ratification Convention, not as The Federalist. Looking at the cases in which
Justice Douglas cited The Federalist Papers in his dissenting opinions24 reaffirms that
The Federalist Papers were largely add-ons for Justice Douglas despite the number
of times he cited them.
One would think that The Federalist Papers held some special significance to
Justice Black, since he cited sixteen separate Papers in five opinions.27 Reading his
opinions, however, contradicts that characterization. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 2 8 a
case questioning state power to burden interstate commerce, Justice Black cited to
six separate Federalist Papers, all in footnotes.29 A footnote citation is all that
appears in his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath.2"0 Even when cited in the text, Justice Black's citations to The Federalist
carry no particular weight.2 '
199 Justices McReynolds, Burton, Reed, and Chief Justice Vinson each cited The
Federalist Papers in two opinions. Justices Murphy, Stone, Butler, and Rutledge cited The
Federalist in only one of their opinions.
200 346 U.S. 100, 109-10 (1953).
201 329 U.S. 69, 76 n.3 (1946).
202 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
203 Id.
204 329 U.S. at 76, n.3.
205 346 U.S. at 109.
206 MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 289, n.1 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting); New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 596-97 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Cramer v.
United States, 325 U.S. 1, 75-76 (1945) (cited in an appendix to the dissenting opinion).
207 In all, he cites The Federalist Nos. 3,4, 5, 22,23,30,32,36,40,41,42,43, 78,80,81,
and 83.
208 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
209 Id. at 62 n.9, 63 n.11, 64 n.12, 68 n.21, 73 n.35 (1941).
20 341 U.S. 123, 144 n.2 (1951) (Black, J., concurring).
211 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946) (citing The Federalist No. 78 only
to make clear the Court's power of judicial review); Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S.
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South-Eastern Underwriters is perhaps the most interesting case study of the
importance of The Federalist Papers during this period. As noted above, Justice
Black cited to seven different Federalist Papers, none of which made it out of the
footnotes." 2 Even conceding that footnotes are sometimes at least as, if not more,
significant than the opinion "in chief, '213 Justice Black's numerous footnote refer-
ences (and that is all they are) do not rise to that level. There is no indication in the
South-Eastern Underwriters opinion that had The Federalist never been written, the
decision would have come out any differently. Justice Black was not the only
opinion writer in South-Eastern Underwriters who cited The Federalist as little
more than the equivalent of a "see also" reference. And Justice Frankfurter's two




When Justice Frankfurter did mention The Federalist Papers, which he did on
four occasions, he certainly put no reliance upon them. The only majority opinion
he wrote where The Federalist Papers are noted was Tenney v. Brandhove,"5 where
the issue was whether legislators were subject to liability under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871.216 Despite his citation to The Federalist No. 48 to demonstrate that the
Framers feared legislative hegemony,217 he and his colleagues in the majority held
that legislators are immune from liability for acts committed in their legislative
capacity.2 ' In the only concurring opinion in which Frankfurter cited The Federalist
Papers, Dennis v. United States ,219 he cited The Federalist No. 41 for the proposition
that protection against foreign dangers is "'one of the primitive objects of civil
society.' 221 Certainly germane to the issue in Dennis,22 1 but hardly of great signifi-
cance. His dissents reflect the same. In Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,222 he
cites The Federalist No. 82 only as a way of collateral support for previous case
372, 397-98 & n.2 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Nos. 81 and 83 only to demonstrate
importance ofjury trials).
212 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 n.9 (No. 22);
id. at 550 n.33 (No. 36); id. at 551 n.36 (Nos. 40 and 41); id. at 551 n.35 (No. 30); id. at 552
n.37 (No. 23); id. at 552 n.38 (No. 43).
213 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989); United States v.
Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
214 South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 583 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
21' 341 U.S. 367, 375 (1951).
216 8 U.S.C. §§ 43, 47(3) (1871) (current version at42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2000)).
217 Tenney, 341 U.S. at 375.
218 Id. at 379.
219 341 U.S. 494, 519 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
220 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison)).
221 Dennis was convicted of violating the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000), which
prohibited advocating, abetting, or conspiring to advocate, the violent overthrow of the
United States government. Dennis was a leader of the American Communist Party. Dennis,
341 U.S. at 497.
222 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
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holdings.223 The same can be said of his opinion in the first Dennis case,224 decided
the year before its more notorious successor.
The period immediately preceding the Warren Court was thus like all periods
that came before. No matter how many times The Federalist Papers were cited, the
number of Papers mentioned in any one opinion, and how many Justices cited them,
the conclusion is the same: The Federalist Papers appear to have had little
influence either on judicial outcomes or on the analysis of individual Justices, on
whichever side of the result they happened to fall. Moreover, as National Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co. demonstrates, the reason is not that the
Court dismissed original understanding as unimportant to contemporary textual
interpretation.225 The Federalist Papers simply played little role in that historical
exegesis.
F. The Warren Years: 1953-1969
The Warren Court will be forever known for judicially spearheading the "rights
revolution." Brown v. Board of Education226 began the long battle that eventually
dismantled Jim Crow. Baker v. Car,27 established the principle that the Equal
Protection Clause 228 demanded that legislatures be apportioned according to popu-
lation,229 leading to the demise of rural-dominated legislatures in states with large
urban populations230 and to the reapportionment of the United States House of
Representatives. 23' Furthermore, legislative bodies no longer had carte blanche to
exclude those with whom they disagreed232 or whose conduct was reprehensible.233
Devotional Bible reading in public schools was declared to be unconstitutional, 234
as was state-imposed prayer in the public schools.235 The exclusionary rule, pro-
hibiting illegally seized evidence in a criminal trial, was extended to the states,236
223 Id. at 713-14.
224 Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950). This case involved the question of
whether the defendant could challenge for cause jurors who were employees of the federal
government. See generally id.
225 Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 621 n.16 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., concurring); id. at 635-36 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
226 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
227 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
228 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
229 Baker, 369 U.S. 186.
230 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
231 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
232 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
233 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
234 Sch. Dist. of Abingdon v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
235 Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
236 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and those accused of crimes could no longer be interrogated without being advised
of their rights to counsel.2 37 The Warren Court reinvigorated "substantive due
process," holding that a married couple had the right to decide whether to use
231contraception, z  which paved the way for the Burger Court holdings that an
individual had the same right.239 Those cases led to the decision that a woman had
the right to terminate her pregnancy,24 as well as the Rehnquist Court's decision,
limited though it may be, that an individual has the right to terminate life support
systems.24' Those merely mark some of the highlights.
Given the Warren Court's attention to the scope of individual liberties rather
than the Constitution's structural provisions, which is the focus of The Federalist
Papers, one might intuitively think that The Federalist Papers would be cited less
than in the previous period, when much of the Court's attention was devoted to the
conflict between federal authority and state autonomy. Surprisingly, the numbers
do not support this. Quite the contrary. The previous period and this one are com-
parable in terms of the years covered (sixteen years of the Roosevelt Court and
fifteen years of the Warren Court). Nevertheless, The Federalist Papers were cited
in thirty-five cases by various Justices who sat during the Warren years, a 35 percent
increase over the previous period. Likewise, The Federalist Papers appeared in
thirty-six opinions during the Warren Years, a 29 percent increase over the previous
period. They were cited in sixteen majority opinions, an equal number of dissenting
opinions, and four concurrences. Percentage-wise, this translates into 44 percent,
44 percent, and approximately 11 percent respectively. That is roughly the same
percentage of majority opinions as during the Roosevelt Court years and only a
slight increase (three percentage points) in the percentage of dissenting opinions.
For all intents and purposes the breakdown was the same. More telling than the
statistics of the number of times and the number of opinions in which The Federalist
Papers were cited is the percentage of Justices serving during the Warren years who
cited The Federalist Papers.
Twenty-one Justices served during the Roosevelt Court years,242 and of those,
eleven, or 52 percent, cited The Federalist Papers. During the Warren years, seventeen
Justices served, four fewer than in the previous period. Eleven Justices (64 percent)
cited The Federalist Papers, a 12 percent increase. The figures might indicate that The
Federalist Papers were more important to the outcome of cases during the Warren
237 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
239 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). While this case was ostensibly decided on
equal protection grounds, given the nature of the right in Griswold, (marital privacy), it is
hard to understand the ruling without reference to the nature of the underlying substantive
right.
240 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
241 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
242 GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTrrUIONAL LAW xc-xcviii (4th ed. 2001).
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Years than during the previous period.243 However, as demonstrated below, when one
shifts from a quantitative to a qualitative analysis, the conclusion is different. The
number of citations, the frequency of those citations, and the percentage of Justices
who cited The Federalist Papers prove to be unreliable indicators of the importance of
The Federalist Papers to that Justice's or the Court's analysis.
Consistent with previous analytic patterns, this section will concentrate on those
Justices who most frequently cited The Federalist Papers. Justice Harlan cited The
Federalist Papers in seven opinions, followed by Justice Frankfurter with six opin-
ions. Only two of Justice Frankfurter's The Federalist citations appeared in majority
opinions; four were in dissenting opinions. Justice Harlan's citations show a similar
pattern, appearing in two majority opinions, four dissents and one concurring opinion.
Both Justices Harlan and Frankfurter generally objected to the Court's more expansive
interpretation of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. 2" Justice Black,
consistent with his citations during the previous period, had the next most opinions in
which The Federalist Papers were cited, with five.
Unlike Frankfurter and Harlan, four of Justice Black's Federalist citations ap-
peared in majority opinions and only one in a dissenting opinion. Justice Douglas
and, maybe surprisingly, Chief Justice Warren were next in the frequent citation
line, with four opinions each.245 All of Warren's citations were in majority opinions
while only one of Justice Douglas's opinions was a majority. Two were dissents
and one was a concurring opinion.
The two majority opinions in which Justice Harlan cited The Federalist Papers,
Glidden Company v. Zadonk'46 and United States v. Johnson,247 noted five different
papers, four in Glidden and one in Johnson. None of these papers appeared at all
significant to his analysis or the Court's ultimate holding. Harlan cited The Federalist
No. 81 twice in Glidden, once as part of a string of citations regarding congressional
discretion to establish lower federal courts24 and again to establish that sovereign
immunity was not surrendered, which was only mentioned to refute argument by
counsel.249 Nos. 80 and 22 were cited for propositions equally unimportant to the
disposition of the matter at hand.250 In Johnson, The Federalist No. 48 is not only
243 See Friedman & Smith, supra note 16, at 22-33 (establishing that the Warren Court
relied upon originalist analysis "when it suited the Court's needs").
244 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504-26 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-61 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
245 Justice Douglas is not separately discussed in this section, whereas Chief Justice
Warren is. The reason is that The Federalist Papers held no more importance to Justice
Douglas during this period than they held during the previous period.
246 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
247 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
248 370 U.S. at 551.
249 Id. at 563-64.
250 Id. at 557-58. The Federalist No. 80 was cited for the idea that federal judicial power
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
cited, it is quoted."' However, the quotation only notes, in a general way, the
reasons for separation of powers.252 It does not relate directly to the Speech and
Debate Clause253 or to its meaning, which was the issue in Johnson.254
Justice Harlan's concurring and dissenting opinions largely follow the same
pattern. His citation to The Federalist No. 68 in Williams v. Rhodes2" was a one of
a number of citations in a footnote.256 In Flast v. Cohen,257 Harlan quoted twelve
words from The Federalist No. 80 only to establish the principle ofjudicial review,
which he then argues, is limited.25 Similarly, in Duncan v. Louisiana,259 Harlan's
citations to The Federalist Nos. 51260 and 84261 only demonstrate the Framers' belief
that the structure of the federal government was sufficient to protect individual
rights.
Justice Harlan's use of The Federalist in his dissent in Wesberry v. Sanders262 is
somewhat more mixed than in his previous opinions. The first several citations follow
his previous pattern of The Federalist citations.2 63 However, Harlan's later quotations
from The Federalist Nos. 54 and 59 do support his main point that apportionment of
Congress is a matter for the states and the Congress, not the courts.264 Finally, in
O'Callahan v. Parker,265 a case involving the jurisdiction of military courts, Harlan's
citation of The Federalist No. 23 to demonstrate Congress's unlimited authority
"[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" 266
was important to his argument that military courts have jurisdiction over military
and legislative power must be coextensive, Id. at 557, while The Federalist No. 22 was used
to note that law is a dead letter without courts. Id. at 558. While both are concepts central to
the role of the judiciary in ensuring that ours is a "government of laws, and not of men,"
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), neither are directly pertinent to the
question of whether it is a violation of due process for an Article I judge to sit on an Article
III court, the issue in Glidden. 370 U.S. 530.
25 383 U.S. at 178-79.
252 Id.
253 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
254 383 U.S. 169.
255 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
256 Id. at 44 n.3.
257 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
25 Id. at 130-31 & n.20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
259 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
26o Id. at 173 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
261 Id. at n.4.
262 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
263 See id, at 27 n.8 (cf. citation to No. 54); id. at 28 n.10 (No. 54); id. at 39 (No. 57 to
refute Justice Black's reading); id. at 30-40 (No. 54 for the same purpose).
264 Id. at 39-41.
265 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
266 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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personnel who commit crimes outside a military base and on free time.267 On the
other hand, his reference to The Federalist Papers is only one sentence of a five-
page discussion of the history of military courts. Consequently, what one gets from
reading Justice Harlan's opinions is that on occasion a Federalist Paper may have
some significance to his analysis, but not often. And even when The Federalist
Papers appear to be important to his analysis, they are no more important than other
historical insights.268
In his majority opinion in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Board,269 Justice Frankfurter cites five different Papers.270  He
mentions The Federalist No. 41 for precisely the same point as he did in Dennis, that
protection against foreign dangers is one of the primitive objects of civil society,'
and his citation to The Federalist Nos. 2-5 is a "see also" citation.272 While certainly
pertinent to the issue in the case, The Federalist citations are only one small part of a
112-page, history-laden opinion. Much the same can be said of Frankfurter's citation
to The Federalist No. 80 in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.273 Cited
in a footnote274 along with Farrand's The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787,275 The Federalist No. 80 is mentioned only to make the point that the need to
establish federal jurisdiction over maritime issues was one of the major reasons for
permitting Congress to establish lower federal courts, 276 a proposition not particularly
pertinent to the facts in Romero.277
The same can be said of three of Justice Frankfurter's four dissents. In Trop v.
Dulles,278 Frankfurter cited The Federalist No. 48 for the unexceptional proposition
that all power is encroaching. 279 His dissenting opinion in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Bowers2"° cited four different Papers - Nos. 12, 67, 44, and 32.281
267 O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 277 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
268 This does not imply that The Federalist Papers are less important than other historical
evidence.
269 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
270 Id. at 95. The Federalist Papers cited are Nos. 41, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The latter four,
however, were simply cited as "Nos. 2-5." Id.
271 Id. at 95 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison)). For a discussion of
Dennis, see supra note 224 and accompanying text.
272 Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 95.
273 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
274 Id. at 361 n.8.
275 1 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911).
276 Romero, 358 U.S. at 361 n.8.
277 See generally Romero, 358 U.S. 354.
278 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
279 Id. at 119 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
280 358 U.S. 534 (1959).
281, Id. at 556 nn.2-3, 574 n.18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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None bore directly on his analysis. Nos. 12, 67, and 44 were footnote citations that
only provided some general historical background 282 and No. 32 was a "see also"
footnote citation.283 Even Frankfurter's powerful structural and historical analysis
in Baker v. Carr"8 hardly relied on The Federalist Papers despite his having cited
four of them, Nos. 54, 56, 58, and 62.285 All were footnote citations and merely
provided some general historical background.286 Only in Farmers' Educational
& Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc. 287 did Frankfurter's citation to a
Federalist Paper seem more than marginally important to his analysis. Justice
Frankfurter cited The Federalist No. 32 as support for his argument that there must
be a plain inconsistency between a federal and state statute for the state statute to be
superseded by federal law.288 Preemption could not be implied from some possi-
bility of a policy difference between federal and state regulatory schemes.289 When
combined with his citations to The Federalist when serving on the Roosevelt Court,
about the best one can say with respect to Justice Frankfurter is that in only one of
the ten opinions in which he cited The Federalist Papers was the citation at all
important to his analysis.29
It would stand to reason that Justice Black's citations to The Federalist Papers
during the Warren years would carry no more import than in the previous period. That
proved to be true. Wesberry v. Sanders"' is perhaps the most significant case during
this period in terms of historical/originalist discourse. Indeed it was the only case
in which one Justice (Harlan) openly disagreed with another Justice's (Black's) inter-
pretation of The Federalist.292 One might wonder, however, why Justice Harlan
bothered. Justice Black's citation of The FederalistNos. 54 and 57 constituted approxi-
mately one paragraph out of an eleven-page historical analysis.293 The Federalist No.
57 was cited only to say that the House of Representatives would be elected by "'the
great body of the people.""'2  Only eight words were quoted from The Federalist 54:
282 Id. at 556 nn.2-3.
283 Id at 574 n.8.
284 369 U.S. 186, 297-324 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
285 See infra note 286.
286 Baker, 369 U.S. at 303 & n.38 (citing The Federalist No. 58, which referred to the
British House of Commons); id. at 307 & n.62 (citing The Federalist No. 56 for general
historical experience, while Nos. 62, id. at 308 n.74, and 54, id at 308 n.75, referred to
apportionment of the United States Congress, not the state legislatures).
287 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
288 Id. at 545-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
289 Id. at 546.
290 Id. at 545-46.
291 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
292 Compare id. at 15 & nn.39-40, 18, with id. at 39-40 (Harlan, J, dissenting).
293 376 U.S. at 15, 18.
294 Id. at 18 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison)).
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"'[N]umbers... are the only proper scale of representation. '295 Pertinent, yes. But
hardly supportive of a strict one person/one vote apportionment. More revealing is
Justice Black's majority opinion in Reid v. Covert,296 a case contesting the juris-
diction of military courts over civilians who commit crimes on military bases.297
Black cites six Federalist Papers, Nos. 26, 27, 28, 41, 78, and 83.298 The citations,
however, were much ado about nothing. All were simply footnote citations, and
four were just string-cited.299 The same conclusion applies to the other opinions in
which Black cites The Federalist Papers.3"° Justice Douglas, too, followed the
pattern of the previous period in citing The Federalist Papers. They are largely
space-filling references.3"1
Chief Justice Warren did not cite The Federalist Papers until 1965, the eleventh
year of his fifteen-year tenure. The first case in which he cited The Federalist
Papers was Singer v. United States.3 2 And there he cited The Federalist No. 83 as
part of a string of citations.3 3 In the same year, however he cited six Papers, Nos.
47, 48, 49, 51, 78, and 44, in United States v. Brown.3 4 Brown raised the question
whether the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,305 which
makes it a crime for Communists to serve as executive board members of a labor
union, was a violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause.30 6 Warren's citations are
interesting not only because they are numerous but because they are logically
ordered to make a single point. But the point is too general to be described as sig-
nificant to the outcome. No. 47 is quoted to demonstrate that the Framers feared all
government power.30 7 No. 48 is then quoted to establish that barriers had to be
erected to contain legislative power,30 8 followed by a cite to No. 44 to confirm that
295 Id. at 15 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison)).
296 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
297 Id.
298 Id. at 10 n.13 (No. 83); id. at 24 n.43 (No. 24).
299 Id. at 29 n.54 (Nos. 26, 27, 28, and 41).
31 See Talleyv. California, 362 U.S. 60,65 (1960) (The Federalist Papers mentioned only
to demonstrate that they were published under pseudonyms); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964) (citing No. 43 only to point out reasons for giving Congress
exclusive power to enact patent laws); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting) (citing No. 44 in first sentence of a two sentence conclusion).
301 See Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 937 n.7 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 574 n.10
(1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 373-77 n.8 (1963).
302 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965).
303 Id.
304 381 U.S. 437, 444-445 nn.17-18 (1965).
305 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2000).
306 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
307 Brown, 381 U.S. at 443.
308 Id. at 444 n.17. Note 17 then string cites Nos. 47, 48, 49, 51, and 78.
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prohibitions against bills of attainder are one of those constraints.3 °" Finally, The
Federalist No. 78 is quoted to show that the Framers believed that the judiciary was
the means by which the Bill of Attainder Clause would be enforced. 310 All of these
propositions were either self-evident or had long since been established. Moreover,
the dissent did not question the Chief Justice's very general historical premises; the
question was one of application. Consequently, it is hard to argue that Warren used
The Federalist Papers in Brown as anything more than historical background, which
was arguably unnecessary to repeat.
One year later, Chief Justice Warren cited The Federalist No. 60 in Bond v.
Floyd,31' a case in which the Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the
Georgia legislature from refusing to seat Julian Bond for certain anti-war statements
he had made.312 The citation to The Federalist No. 60, which is attributed to Hamilton,
confirmed earlier statements by Madison regarding the dangers of congressional power
to determine the qualifications of legislators.
3 13
Finally, the Chief Justice cited The Federalist Nos. 52 and 60, but this time in
a suit that raised the question whether the United States House of Representatives
could fail to seat a duly-elected representative for conduct it deemed to be un-
becoming a House member.314 The citations to The Federalist Nos. 60315 and 52,316
while more to the point in this case than in Bond, nevertheless constituted only about
one page of a nineteen-page discussion of constitutional history.
The Warren Court period thus resembles the other periods analyzed. While
there are a few isolated opinions in which The Federalist Papers seemed to be of
some importance to the authors' analysis, these cases are a small minority of those
in which The Federalist Papers are cited. And even in those cases where one can
conclude that The Federalist Papers are of some importance to the analyses, they
do not dominate the historical discussion. They are only a building block a small
piece of a much larger body of historical evidence.
G. The Burger Court: 1969-1986
The approximately sixteen years during which Warren Burger was the Chief
Justice has been characterized as a period of retrenchment from the Warren years.317
31 Id. at 444 n.18.
310 Id. at 462.
311 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
312 Id.
313 Id, at 135 n.13.
114 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
311 Id. at 539.
316 Id, at 540 n.74.
317 A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WiS. L. REv. 309, 354
(2003) (stating that "the Warren Court's enlargement of the federal habeas corpus writ
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Warren Burger was appointed by President Richard Nixon in part because of his
conservative views, particularly regarding constitutional protections for those accused
of crimes.318 Warren Burger earned a reputation for just that while serving on the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. During his tenure as Chief Justice the
Court did retrench somewhat, particularly with respect to the rights of criminal
defendants. 3 9 The Court also halted the expansion of the Equal Protection Clause
that marked the Warren years, refusing to expand equality principles into the area of
state and federal social welfare programs, including education.320
But there were some marked exceptions as well. First, the Burger Court made
significant advances in achieving gender equality, moving from the Chief Justice's
rational basis standard in Reed v. Reed321 to a higher level of scrutiny (often described
as "mid-level") five years later in Craig v. Boren.322 Second, the Burger Court explic-
itly approved what were then considered far-reaching remedial powers to enforce
school desegregation decrees.323 It stopped only when interdistrict remedies were
sought, except in very narrow circumstances.324 Finally, substantive due process
flourished during the Burger Court era, marked by what many consider the most
controversial decision of the modem era - Roe v. Wade.
325
experienced retrenchment during the tenures of Chief Justices Warren Burger and William
Rehnquist."); Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique andProposed
Reconstruction ofDeath Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1,2 (2002) (stating
that "the Burger Court had begun to use reinvigorated waiver doctrines to chip away at the
Warren Court's habeas jurisprudence."); Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional
Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959-2001,
29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127, 151 (2004) (describing "the Supreme Court's retrenchment of
many Warren Court liberties during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts").
318 A Professional for the High Court, TIME, May 30, 1969, at 16.
319 Seee.g., U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984);
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
320 See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down
Texas law prohibiting tuition-free primary and secondary education to undocumented
children).
321 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
322 429 U.S. 190, 197-200 (1976); see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982).
323 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214 (1973); see also Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
324 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
325 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
(recognizing, albeit in dictum, the right of intimate association beyond the family context);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing the right to marry as a fundamental
right, at least when asserted in the context of an equal protection claim); Moore v. City of
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing as fundamental the right to live with
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The Burger Court also decided a number of cases dealing with difficult
structural issues, cases in which the constitutional design, and thus The Federalist
Papers, might naturally play an important role in the outcome. In addition to what,
by 1969, had become "run of the mill" Commerce Clause cases testing both the
scope of federal 326 and state authority,327 the Court decided six significant separation
of powers cases3 28 and four equally important Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity cases.329 Yet this, in and of itself, does not explain the extraordinary
number of citations to The Federalist Papers during Chief Justice Burger's tenure.
Twelve Justices served during the approximately sixteen years of Burger
stewardship, five less than served over the same number of years during the previous
era.330 Every Justice who served during this period cited The Federalist Papers, as
contrasted with 64 percent of those who served during the Warren years. More
significantly, The Federalist Papers were cited in sixty-nine cases, a 97 percent
increase over the previous sixteen years. In addition, seventy-eight different opinions
cited The Federalist Papers, contrasted with thirty-six opinions during the Warren
Court years, a 117 percent increase. Of those, forty (51 percent) were majority opin-
ions (an 8 percent increase), thirty-two (41 percent) were dissents (an insignificant
decrease), and six (or 8 percent, compared with 11 percent during the previous period)
were concurring opinions. Six Justices, 50 percent of those who served during this
period, accounted for 60 percent of the opinions in which The Federalist Papers were
cited. Chief Justice Burger mentioned The Federalist most frequently (thirteen
opinions), followed by Justices Powell (twelve), Brennan (eleven), Rehnquist and
extended family).
326 See, e.g., Fed. EnergyReg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). Not included
in the "run of the mill" list are Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985), and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). These cases,
the contours of which are still being debated by the Court today, such as in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), appear to fall somewhere between the "old-fashioned
cases" like Perez, in which the question was the power of the federal government to regulate
private actors, and the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cases, in which private
litigants enlist the judicial arm of the federal and state governments to enforce federal rights
against the states. See infra note 329
327 See, e.g., Ne. Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985);
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117
(1978).
328 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Nixon
v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
329 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410
(1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Dep't. of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
330 STONE, supra note 242, at xc-xcviii.
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Douglas (eight each), and O'Connor (six).33 ' The pertinent question is whether the
astonishing increase in the frequency with which The Federalist Papers were cited
during this period translates into an increased importance of The Federalist Papers to
the Justices' analyses or the Court's ultimate resolution of the constitutional issues.
Because of the number of opinions in which The Federalist Papers are referenced
and the frequency of those references by individual Justices, each Justice citing The
Federalist Papers will be considered in a separate subsection. In addition, no Justice
who cited The Federalist fewer than six times will be considered. Their opinions are
noted in the Appendix, however. Indeed, the only reasons for including Justice
O'Connor despite the fact that she cited The Federalist Papers half or fewer as many
times as three of her colleagues are that she did so in the short span of five years and
she has been one of the Court's most articulate defenders of state autonomy, an issue
that has recently been dominated by discussions of original understanding.
1. Chief Justice Burger
Because he cited The Federalist Papers most frequently, the qualitative analysis
begins with Chief Justice Burger. Unlike Justice Harlan, who cited The Federalist
Papers in only two majority opinions, Chief Justice Burger's citations to The
Federalist appeared in only two dissents.332 The eleven other references (85
percent) appeared in majority opinions. Were the citations to The Federalist Papers
instrumental or even significant to Chief Justice Burger's (or the Court's, in the case
of majority opinions) historical analysis, much less to the result in the case? One
would be hard pressed to make that claim. In nine of the thirteen cases in which The
Federalist Papers were cited, they played no apparent role, significant or otherwise,
in the decision.333 The citations to The Federalist Papers in the other four cases
deserve greater attention.
... Justice O'Connor served for only five of the sixteen years of the Burger Court. By
contrast, Justice Harlan, who cited The Federalist so frequently during the Warren years,
cited it seven times during the fourteen years he served on the Burger Court.
332 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 87-88 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Nixon v. Adm'r. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 507 n.2 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
... Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (No. 47); Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,294 (1981) ("the Federalist
Papers"); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294 n.24 (1981) (No. 64); United States v. Will, 449
U.S. 200,218 (1980) (No. 79); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579
(1980) (No. 84); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 507 n.2 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (No. 48); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976)
(No. 39); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704, 708 n.17 (1974) (Nos. 47 and 64);
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 522-23 (1972) (No. 73).
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In Goldstein v. California'14 the issue was whether California's prosecution of
the defendant for pirating music was inconsistent with the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution."' Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion cited The Federalist No. 43
only to explain the purpose of the Copyright Clause336 and No. 42 to point out the
difference between this case and a state's imposition of a tariff.337 As in Goldstein,
the Chief Justice cited two Papers in Schick v. Reed,338 a case questioning whether
the President's pardon power included the right to commute a sentence. 339 The
Federalist Nos. 6934o and 74341 may have played a somewhat more important part in
the decision than in Goldstein, but not significantly so. Both were cited generally
(one in a footnote) and, while certainly not out of place, could have been excised
from the opinion without giving the reader the impression that the Court somehow
missed an analytical beat.
Chief Justice Burger's other majority opinion, INS v. Chadha,342 cited seven
separate Federalist Papers. But the number of papers cited appears to have had
little relationship to the importance of The Federalist Papers to the ultimate out-
come. No. 73 and 51 were quoted simply to illustrate that the President had some
role in the lawmaking process, his veto power.3 43 The citation to Nos. 51 and 62
demonstrated the historical point that the Framers' fear was not the Executive but
the Congress.3" The Federalist No. 22 was used only to buttress the reasons why
the Framers established a bi-cameral legislature, 345 and Nos. 64, 66, and 75 were
string-cited in a footnote without elaboration or explanation.346 It is hard to know
what to make of the extensive citation list. No doubt they supported the claims the
Court was making, but the claims were hardly new. The most apt analogy would
be a modem court's citation to Marbury v. Madison347 to prove that the Supreme
Court has the power of judicial review. Correct, certainly, but hardly necessary or,
in this day and age, even helpful.
Chief Justice Burger's citation to The Federalist No. 51 in his dissent in Schad
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim3"4 is somewhat more difficult to assess. Schad was
334 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
335 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
336 412 U.S. at 555-56 &n.ll.
337 Id. at 559.
338 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
339 Id.
31 Id. at 263 (discussing the President's "prerogative" to issue pardons).
341 Id., n.6 (expounding the same issue).
342 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
343 Id. at 947-48.
3" Id. at 950.
341 Id. at 949.
34 Id. at 956, n.21.
347 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
348 452 U.S. 61, 87-88 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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a First Amendment challenge to a zoning ordinance that prohibited live entertain-
ment in the Borough.349 In a short, three-page opinion, Burger cited The Federalist
No. 51 to emphasize that the Court should exercise judicial restraint when
confronted with a challenge to legislation with such a local impact as regulating
local land uses. 5° One might argue that the citation to The Federalist No. 51, while
not absolutely essential to that argument, was certainly helpful. On the other hand,
judicial restraint appeared not to be the focus of Burger's disagreement with the
majority. Rather,.he disagreed that the subject of the prohibition, in this case nude
dancing, was entitled to any First Amendment protection. 5 Whatever one may say
about The Federalist No. 51 and judicial restraint when it comes to matters of
peculiarly local concern, it is somewhat out of place in a First Amendment case. If
the First Amendment protects the activity prohibited, judicial restraint is not
appropriate.352 And if it does not protect live nude dancing, then judicial restraint
is applied as a matter of course under the rubric of rational basis due process.
Therefore, it is hard to conclude that The Federalist No. 51 is much more than
window dressing.
2. Justice Powell
Of the twelve opinions in which Justice Powell cited The Federalist Papers, in
only one does the reference seem important to his analysis. It was not, however, the
lynchpin. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,353 Powell
mentions four Federalist Papers - Nos. 39, 45, 17, and 46 - in his historical
analysis. The first mention of these is an important piece of his argument regarding
the constitutional necessity of retaining the sovereignty of the separate states. 4 On
the other hand, his quotations from The Federalist Papers covered only two pages
of a ten-page historical analysis. 55 His references in two other cases are ambiguous
341 Schad, 452 U.S. 61.
350 Id. at 87-88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
151 "To invoke the First Amendment... in this case trivializes and demeans that great
Amendment." Id. at 88.
352 I do not mean to paper over the impact of federalism values on how broadly rights are
defined. See generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties:
Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 -N.Y.U. L. REv. 723 (1979). But Chief Justice
Burger did not seem to be headed in that direction. Neither is this paper.
313 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
114 Id. at 570-72 (Powell, J., dissenting). He also cited The FederalistNos. 17 and 46 five
pages later, id. at 575 n. 18, but those citations are contained in a simple "e.g." reference.
115 Id. at 568-77. This is not to suggest that The Federalist Papers were insignificant to
Justice Powell. It is only to point out that the historical evidence he marshaled in support of
his argument is persuasive even without mention of The Federalist. He -did not rely
exclusively, or even largely, on it.
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in terms of their nexus to his analysis. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,356 a Dormant
Commerce Clause case, he cited The Federalist Nos. 11 and 42 for the proposition
that the Framers thought that the Constitution contemplated a regime of unrestrained
trade. 35 But, like his opinion in Garcia, The Federalist was only one of several
historical documents, four in this instance, that supported his argument.358
His reference to The Federalist No. 81 in Patsy v. Board of Regents359 is the
most difficult to assess. First, the citation is not mentioned in the text - it is
confined to a footnote. Second, the footnote does not independently cite to No. 81;
it refers to the reliance on No. 81 by the Court in Hans v. Louisiana. But Powell,
unlike the majority, perceived the issue in Patsy to be a straightforward question of
state sovereignty under the Eleventh Amendment.36 ' And Hans was the seminal
Eleventh Amendment case, setting the stage for the Court's current sovereign
immunity jurisprudence. So Justice Powell may have thought that there was no
reason to rehash settled doctrine to make his point.
Justice Powell's references to The Federalist Papers in the other nine cases
unquestionably did not reach the level of importance of the three noted above. And
that includes three cases in which one might have thought that The Federalist,
because of the issues involved, would have been more important to Justice Powell:
A tascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,362 INS v. Chadha,36 3 and EEOC v. Wyoming.364
In Atascadero, Powell cited four Federalist Papers, Nos. 17, 46, 39, and 45, but did
so only in a footnote, and even then by way of two "see, e.g." cites.365 By contrast,
in Chadha Powell cited Nos. 47 and 48 in the text, but only for background on
matters that needed little citation.3' Finally, in EEOC v. Wyoming, Justice Powell's
dissent referred to three Papers, Nos. 41, 45, and 84. Nos. 41 and 84 were footnote
references, 367 and while No. 45 was noted in the opinion's text,361 it may as well
356 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
311 Id. at 448 (Powell, J., dissenting).
358 Id. at 447-48 (including Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
359 457 U.S. 496, 527 n.12 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
3- 134 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1890).
361 Patsy, 457 U.S. at 519-536 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority characterized the
issue as whether exhaustion of remedies was a prerequisite to an action under Section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Patsy, 457 U.S. 496.
362 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (state sovereign immunity).
363 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (one-house legislative veto of Executive immigration decisions).
364 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state
and local governments).
365 473 U.S. at 238 n.2.
'66 462 U.S. at 960-61 (Powell, J., concurring). The Federalist No. 47 was mentioned for
the proposition that concentration of power produces tyranny, and No. 48 followed a quote
from Jefferson regarding the dangers of the legislature exercising judicial powers. Id.
367 EEOC, 460 U.S. at 268 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting) (No. 41); id. at 270 n.6 (No. 84).
368 Id. at 270-71.
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have been a string of citations with No. 84 since the position of the text in which the
citation appears merely described non-debatable, general principles of federalism.369
Citations in the other six cases contributed little if anything to either the outcome or
the analysis.370
3. Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan cited The Federalist Papers in twelve opinions, the same
number as Justice Powell and only one fewer than the Chief Justice. Moreover, and
maybe even more surprising, The Federalist Papers carried at least as much weight
in the opinions in which Brennan cited them as they did in the opinions of his two
more "conservative" colleagues. The Federalist Papers seemed to play something
more than an insignificant, but certainly a less than crucial, role in three of his
opinions,37' the same number (and a marginally higher percentage) as both the Chief
Justice and Justice Powell. In Schor, Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's
ruling that the CFTC could hear state law counterclaims in reparation proceedings
before the Commission.372 At first blush, Justice Brennan's quotations from The
Federalist Nos. 46371 and 78... seem to be little more than background - citations
to prove the obvious. But certainly his citation to No. 78 was important, if not
essential, to his argument that legislative convenience cannot override the Framers'
concern that matters within the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary be resolved by
independent, Article III judges.375
Northern Pipeline presented an issue similar to that of Schor: whether
conferring broad judicial power on bankruptcy judges violated Article HI. 376 Here
369 Id.
370 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,612 (1985) (Nos. 4,24, and 25); County ofOneida
v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. State, 470 U.S. 226,234 n.4 (1985) (No. 42); Selective Serv.
Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 861 n.3 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (Nos. 4, 25, and 24); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478
(1981) (No. 82); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,461 n.11 (1978)
(No. 44); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 193 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (No.
78).
371 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 859-67 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,247-302 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52-89 (1982)
(plurality).
372 Schor, 478 U.S. 833.
13 Id. at 859-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
314 Id. at 860-61. The quotation from No. 46 seems less important to his analysis only
because it affirms the proposition that secondary students learn (or ought to learn) in Civics:
that concentration of power in one branch of government leads to tyranny. Id. at 859-60.
171 Id. at 860-61.
376 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 50.
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Brennan quoted from The Federalist Nos. 47377 and 78178 and cited No. 79 to demon-
strate the Framers' reason for including the provision in Article ImI regarding
Congress's inability to diminish the salary of federal judges. 379 This was important
to the plurality's outcome.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Atascadero leaves no doubt about the significance
of The Federalist Papers to his view of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
Indeed, The Federalist Papers were far more important to the analysis in Justice
Brennan's dissent than they were to Justice Powell's majority opinion. Conse-
quently, one cannot explain Brennan's citations solely by the issue in the case - the
Eleventh Amendment - and the historical debate that has, since day one, surrounded
thatjurisprudence. Justice Brennan cites three The Federalist Papers - Nos. 81, 32,
and 80.380 Federalist No. 32 seems relatively unimportant to Justice Brennan's
analysis, appearing in two places38' but never quoted in the main text of the opinion.
The other two Federalist Papers, however, are quoted in the text of his opinion, and
No. 81 is quoted extensively.382 The Federalist Nos. 80 and 81 were central to Justice
Brennan's conclusion that the "plan of the convention" abrogated state sovereign
immunity with respect to matters over which Congress was given legislative
authority.383 The same, however, cannot be said of the other eight cases in which he
cited The Federalist Papers.3 4
177 Id. at 57.
378 Id. at 58. No. 78 is also mentioned on the next page of the opinion. Id. at 59 n.10.
371 Id. at 60.
380 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 275-78, 277 n.25,278 n.27 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 277 & n.25.
382 Id. at 275-76 (No. 81); id. at 277 n.25, 278 n.27 (No. 80). Brennan not only cited
extensively from The Federalist No. 81, but also explained how it and other of Hamilton's
The Federalist writings supported his view that where the federal government was given
substantive legislative authority, the "'plan of the convention' abrogated state sovereign
immunity. Id. at 277-78.
383 Id.
34 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594-95 (1985) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (Nos. 47 and 79); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 & n.22 (1982) (No.
51); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 56 & n.7 (1982) (Nos. 10 and 51); Nixon v. Adm'r of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,442 & n.5 (1977) (No. 47); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 857 n.1, 876, 877 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (No. 46); Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 625 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (no specific paper cited);
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 nn.4-5 (1976) (Nos. 11, 12, 42 and 44);
id. at 291 n. 12 (No. 12, 30, 32, 35, and 36) (all but one of the Michelin citations were either
string, "see," or "see also" cites.); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 317 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (No. 81).
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4. Justices Douglas and Rehnquist
Justice Douglas cited The Federalist Papers in seven cases,3"' while then-Justice
Rehnquist cited them in eight cases."" Justice Douglas continued the pattern he set
in the previous two periods, citing a relatively large number of papers with no
particular importance placed on those citations. 387 Next to Justice Brennan, Justice
Rehnquist perhaps provides the most interesting case study. One would think not
only that he would be a frequent user of The Federalist Papers in his opinions, but
also that he would place some significant reliance upon them. The first was true,
although not to the degree that might have been expected, given that he served for
fourteen of the sixteen years of the Burger Court.388 The second, however, was
simply not the case, at least during this period.389
The nature of the cases in which he cited The Federalist Papers provides little
explanation. Two of the cases in which he cited The Federalist were death penalty
cases, Furman v. Georgia3 90 and Coleman v. Balkcom.39' In Furman, Rehnquist
cited The Federalist No. 78 for the now obvious proposition that courts were
established to keep government in check, and No. 51 for the somewhat contrary
proposition that courts ought to exercise restraint in asserting their judicial review
powers.392 In Coleman, Rehnquist again cited No. 51 simply to suggest that the
Court might have devoted too much attention to controlling the government and not
enough to allowing government to control the governed.393 In neither case did he
make a big point of the Court's having strayed too far from the moorings the Framers
had laid. And in both cases Rehnquist's main complaint was with the substance of
the Court's actions, as his citation in Furman to The Federalist No. 78 attests.9
One might argue that death penalty cases seem particularly unsuited for the
application of The Federalist Papers because the major issue is individual rights
rather than structural concerns, although Rehnquist's citations related to structural
385 Justice Douglas's seven cases are as follows: Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208,232 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (No. 76); Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 572 & n.1 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (No. 43); Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389,417-18 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (No. 79); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
21 & n.6, 22 (1972) (No. 41); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972) (No.
80); Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887,888 (197 1) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial ofcertiorari)
(No. 43); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 178 n. 1 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part) (No. 15).
386 See infra notes 392-409 and accompanying text.
387 See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
388 STONE, supra note 242, at xc-xcviii.
389 But see infra notes 523-29 and accompanying text.
390 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
31 451 U.S. 949 (1981).
392 408 U.S. at 466 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (No. 78); id. at 469-70 (No. 51).
393 451 U.S. at 962 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (No. 51).
394 408 U.S. at 466 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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concerns over the judiciary's role. On the other hand, he wrote opinions in three
cases in which The Federalist Papers would seem to provide fertile ground for
mining the Framers' understanding: Dames & Moore v. Regan,395 Northeast
Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,396 and Edelman
v. Jordan.397 In Dames & Moore, the citation generically referred to "The Federalist
Papers"'39 and in Northeast Bancorp, Nos. 7 and 22 were part of a string of citations
regarding the Framers' desire to prevent economic "'Balkanization."' 3 99 Perhaps
most surprising is Edelman, given the critical importance that original understanding
has played in the Rehnquist Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence.4"' The
Federalist No. 81, so crucial to original understanding both before and after
Edelman, is cited in a footnote, and then only because Rehnquist quoted from a
previous case which had cited to that Paper.4° Moreover, The Federalist No. 81 was
not the only source cited; the footnote also contains quotes from James Madison and
John Marshall from the Virginia Ratification Convention.402 This is not to suggest
that The Federalist No. 81 is not germane to determining the scope of Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity; it plainly is. °3 It is only to point out that Justice
Rehnquist did not give it the prominence that later decisions did. The Federalist No.
81 seems at best to be a bit player in Rehnquist's analysis.
In two of the other three cases in which Rehnquist mentioned The Federalist
Papers, they were, if anything, of even less significance. In Jones v. Rath Packing
Co.,4 The Federalist No. 32 appeared only because it was contained in a quote
from Goldstein v. California.405 In only one of the eight cases did Rehnquist's
mention of The Federalist Papers even raise a serious question as to importance:
Railway Labor Executives'Ass "n v. Gibbons,4°6 a case interpreting the Bankruptcy
395 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (addressing the presidential power to waive claims against foreign
governments).
396 472 U.S. 159 (1985) (analyzing constitutionality underthe Dormant Commerce Clause
of state statutes which allegedly discriminated against non-New England bank holding
companies with respect to acquisition of New England banks).
397 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (discussing waiver ofEleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).
398 453 U.S. at 659.
3" 472 U.S. at 174.
o See infra notes 437-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rehnquist
Court's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cases.
401 415 U.S. at 661 n.9 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Miss., 292 U.S. 313 (1934)).
402 Id.
4o "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent." THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
4 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
405 Id. at 545 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 243
(Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961))); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 813-14 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
735-36 (1974) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison))).
4 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
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Clause.4 7 Arguably, The Federalist No. 42 provided, at least in part, support for a
broad reading of Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause by analogizing the
scope of the bankruptcy power to that of the commerce power. 8 However, and
admittedly this conclusion like others is a judgment call, The Federalist No. 42 was
not crucial to Justice Rehnquist's argument, nor did he attempt to make it so."
5. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor cited The Federalist Papers in only six of her opinions.
However, she served for a relatively short time during this period, five years, and
was the junior Justice during those years.410 In addition, Justice O'Connor has been
one of the primary architects of the "new federalism" which more than anything
defined the succeeding period, the Rehnquist Court.41' This "new federalism" is a
jurisprudence that has sought to define a sphere of state authority protected from
federal preemption." 2 It has been the structural understandings of the Framers, at
least as understood by Justice O'Connor and later Justices Scalia and Kennedy, that
has been the benchmark of the states' sphere of influence.413 Consequently, despite
her citation to The Federalist in only six cases, it is important to look closely at the
use of The Federalist Papers in those cases, not only for what they reveal about the
extent to which The Federalist Papers were useful to the Burger Court's search for
original understanding, but also in order to compare The Federalist Papers' signifi-
cance in the preceding periods and the even more extensive use of The Federalist
Papers in the years of the Rehnquist Court.
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
408 Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 465-66.
o The Court declared a statute (the Rock Island Transition and Employee Assistance Act)
designed to protect employees of the Rock Island Railroad (then in bankruptcy
reorganization) unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's powers under the uniformity
requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457. In reaching this conclusion,
then-Justice Rehnquist argued that it was important to distinguish Congress's bankruptcy
powers from its commerce powers. Id. at 465. The Federalist No. 42 was cited for the
proposition that doing so "is admittedly not an easy task, for the two Clauses are closely
related." Id. The reason why The Federalist ultimately did not influence the decision was that
the Court eventually did distinguish between the two clauses despite Madison's belief that
it was difficult to do so.
410 STONE, supra note 242, at xc-xcviii.
411 David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2004); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending
Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2003).
412 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 24-37 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981), cited in H.
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 655
(1979).
113 H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79 VA. L. REv. 633,
657 (1979).
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Two of the cases in which Justice O'Connor cited The Federalist Papers were
precursors to what became the current Court's doctrine of state immunity from
direct federal regulation.414 In both cases Justice O'Connor dissented from decisions
in which the Court upheld the right of the federal government to regulate the "states
qua states" under the Commerce Clause. The first was Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v. Mississippi.415 Justice O'Connor cited three Federalist Papers, Nos.
15, 16, and 45.416 Her citations to Nos. 1547 and 16418 seem innocuous at first blush,
mere background historical information regarding the difficulties encountered under
the Articles of Confederation by the federal government's inability to act directly
with respect to individuals. The same can be said of her mention of No. 45 in a
footnote. 419 However, what appeared to be little more than background information
regarding the shift from the Articles to the Constitution became the foundation
supporting the decision fifteen years later in Printz. It is thus not so easy to dismiss
O'Connor's Federalist citations as mere window-dressing. Not so with the second
case, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.420 Of the ten Papers
cited in Garcia, Justice O'Connor accounted for three, Nos. 17, 45, and 51 .42' Here
they were mentioned only by way of general background regarding the Framers'
view that it was important to create a system in which governmental power was
diffusely parceled out,422 a fundamental proposition known to most who paid the
least bit of attention in their high school civics classes.
In the other four cases, The Federalist Papers had little impact on either Justice
O'Connor's analysis or the outcome of the decision, nor were they relevant to the
development of some broader structural principle. Heath v. Alabama423 was a
double jeopardy case in which O'Connor mentioned The Federalist No. 9 for the
well-known proposition that states have certain important attributes of sovereignty.424
In Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp.,425 she cited The Federalist No. 64
as supporting the notion that the Court should not impute an intent to abrogate a
treaty.426 Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight427 posed a first
amendment freedom of association issue in which Justice O'Connor cited The
414 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992).
415 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
416 Id. at 791-93, 796 n.35 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
417 Idat 791-92.
418 Id. at 792-93.
419 Id. at 796 n.35.
420 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
421 Id. at 582.
422 id.
423 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
424 Id. at 93.
425 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
426 Id. at 253.
427 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
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Federalist No. 10 simply to add extra weight to her more generalized point about the
limited opportunity for direct participation in republican forms of government.428
Finally in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue,429 another First Amendment case, The Federalist No. 84 was only a "cf."
citation.430 In sum, of the six cases in which Justice O'Connor mentioned The
Federalist Papers, in only one could it be fairly argued that they played any signifi-
cant role in the decision. And even in that case the significance of The Federalist
Papers did not become apparent for another decade and a half when they reappeared
to form the basis of a much broader understanding of federalism.
During the sixteen years of the Burger Court, the remarkable increase in the
number of opinions in which The Federalist appeared and in the number of Justices
who cited them is not matched by the significance of The Federalist Papers to the
Court or to the individual Justices who made use of them. Certainly some Justices,
most particularly Powell, O'Connor, and Brennan, relied in a qualitative sense on
The Federalist Papers more than others like Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice
Rehnquist. But there was no consistency even among Justices Powell, O'Connor,
and Brennan. Moreover, the analysis of the Burger years does not support certain
intuitions that I had going into this study. First, it is difficult to match the
significance of The Federalist to the nature of the issue raised by the case, as the
contrast between Justice O'Connor's citation of The Federalist Papers in Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and Garcia demonstrates.43' And second, as the
comparative analysis of Justice Brennan's use of The Federalist Papers contrasted
with that of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell establishes popular perceptions
of a Justice's "political" bent, at least during this period, are not a terribly accurate
predictor of the significance of The Federalist Papers to the Justice citing them.
H. The Rehnquist Court: 1986-2002432
Even more so than the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court has, to date,
profoundly reshaped the structural norms upon which our governmental institutions
are based.433 Congressional power to regulate commerce has been restricted,
428 Id. at 285. The same can be said for her concurring opinion in South Carolina v.
Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 397 (1984) (O'Conner, J., concurring) (No. 81).
429 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
430 Id. at 584.
41, See supra notes 415, 422 and accompanying text.
432 The analysis ends with 2002 only because the sixteen-year span between 1986 and
2002 is the same number of years the Court was under the stewardship of Chief Justice
Burger. While many factors other than the number of years compared may account for a
difference in the number of cases and opinions in which The Federalist is cited (e.g., the
nature of the cases accepted for review, the interpretative views of the Justices, etc.), by
ending the study with 2002, at least one variable is eliminated.
... As Professor Merrill reminds us, the Rehnquist Court's "structural revolutions" did not
begin until after 1994. Merrill, supra note 30, at 569-70. The first eight years were
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particularly when it is exercised with respect to activities that themselves cannot be
fairly denominated as commercial.434 Similarly, Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi became the majority opinion
in New York v. United States. 435 Congress may neither commandeer a state's legis-
lative agenda nor require its executive personnel to enforce federal law. 436 State
sovereign immunity embodied in the once obscure Eleventh Amendment is no
longer simply a jurisdictional provision preventing states from being sued, eo
nomine, in a United States court,43' but rather has been interpreted to be an essential
element of the Framers' federalist design, protecting states from individual suits in
state courts438 and federal administrative adjudicatory proceedings.4 39 Moreover, the
immunity extends even to those matters over which the federal government has
exclusive regulatory authority."' Finally, Congress's powers under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment have been significantly limited, sometimes with a little help
from the Eleventh Amendment, 44 sometimes not.
442
This study does not calculate the number of constitutional cases in which
fundamental structural issues were raised, but whatever the total number, the
importance of the cases, certainly over the near term, cannot be underestimated. In
addition to those mentioned above dealing with federalism issues, a number of
important separation of powers cases were also decided during the sixteen-year
period studied, some more familiar than others. Morrison v. Olson43 upheld the
independent counsel legislation, Clinton v. Jones'4 permitted civil suits against a
sitting president, and in Clinton v. City of New York,"5 the Court struck down the
Line Item Veto Act. Perhaps less well known, but still significant, are Loving v.
dominated by "social issues" cases. Id.
411 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
435 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
436 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
437 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). See generally Melvin Durchslag,
Symposium, State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 817 (2000).
438 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
439 See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
40 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
"' See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001).
442 City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
443 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
4" 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
445 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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United States, 6 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc. ,447 and Metropolitan Washington
Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement ofAircraft Noise, Inc.44' Indeed,
even in Printz, best known for its federalism principle of commandeering state
executive officers, Justice Scalia opined that the attempt to delegate the enforcement
of federal law to state officials violated the President's powers to faithfully execute
the laws under Article II, Section 3.4 Others are explored in greater depth below.
The point is that with the number of federalism and separation of powers cases
that the Court decided during this period 450 and the seeming importance of these
cases to our understanding of constitutional structure, to say nothing of the
appointment of several self-described originalists, it should come as no surprise that
The Federalist Papers were cited with such frequency and in such numbers. The
Federalist was cited in ninety-eight cases, compared with sixty-nine in the previous
sixteen-year period, a 42 percent increase. That is not quite as remarkable as the 97
percent increase during the Burger years from the previous period, but that too
should be no surprise given the base from which the percentages are calculated. The
same conclusion is reached when the number of opinions in which The Federalist
Papers are cited is compared to the previous period, 117 as compared to seventy-
eight during the Burger years, a 62.8 percent increase. 451' And like the previous
period, all thirteen Justices who served from 1986 to 2002 cited The Federalist.42
Interestingly, during this period The Federalist was cited extensively by those
whom one might not think would do so, including Justices Breyer, Stevens,
Blackmun, White, and Souter, whose opinion in Printz is as originalist an opinion
as one can imagine.453 Of the ten opinions in which Justice Breyer cited The
-6 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (holding that Congress, not the President, has power to determine
whether the death penalty may be imposed on individuals in uniform).
44' 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (holding unconstitutional Congress's attempt to reopenjudgments
rendered by courts in Section 10(b)(5) actions when those judgments were rendered under
a previous statute of limitations).
448 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (holding unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to appoint a
board of its own members to run Ronald Reagan National Airport).
449 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 (1997).
450 This is not to suggest that the Court during this sixteen-year period was not busy in
other areas of importance as well. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989).
41' Again the percentage increase is smaller than that of the Burger years when compared
to the previous period (also sixteen years), but that is because The Federalist Papers were
cited in only thirty-six opinions during the Warren Court period.
412 Fifty-one of the opinions (44 percent) were majority opinions, forty-one (35 percent)
were dissents, and twenty-two (21 percent) were concurrences. This is a shift from the
Burger years when the percentages of majority, dissenting and concurring opinions were 52
percent, 42 percent and 6 percent respectively.
411 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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Federalist, six (60 percent) were dissents and one (10 percent) was a concurrence.
Justice Stevens cited The Federalist Papers in twenty-three cases, one. more than
Justice Scalia. Of those, twelve were dissenting opinions (43 percent) and only one
(4 percent) was a concurrence. Fifty percent of Justices Souter's (six of twelve) and
Blackmun's (two of four) paper citations appeared in dissenting opinions, while 67
percent of citations to The Federalist Papers by Justice White (two of three) were
in majority opinions. Moreover, "the Federalist five," 44 Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and White (and now Justice Thomas),
accounted for 53 percent of the opinions in which The Federalist Papers were cited
(sixty-seven of 127). It may well be that the way in which the Court discusses
constitutional issues has changed, but that depends upon an assessment of the
importance of The Federalist Papers to the citing Justices.
Analysis of the Rehnquist Court will proceed as previously, with a separate look
at each Justice who cited The Federalist Papers. Those Justices whose use of The
Federalist Papers was insignificant either in numbers or importance, or whose
citations have been previously analyzed because they were holdovers from the
Burger or Warren Courts, will not be separately discussed, although their opinions
are noted in the Appendix. 5 Similarly, the analysis of each Justice will proceed as
before, starting with the Justice who most often cited The Federalist Papers and
working down in order of frequency. However, rather than starting with Justice
Stevens (twenty-three) and then proceeding to Justices Scalia (twenty-two),
Kennedy (twelve), and so on, the analysis will begin with those most commonly
thought to be formalists and originalists, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, the Court's current so-called conservative
majority. The significance of The Federalist Papers to these Justices will then be
compared to those who often find themselves in the minority, not only in structural
cases but in other high-profile cases as well.4"6
454 See Ann Althouse, The Federalist Five, 76 ABA J. 46 (1990).
455 These include Justices Powell (one citation), Ginsburg (two citations), White, and
Marshall (three each). Justices Brennan and Blackmun, with four citations each, were only
two shy of the six citations by Justice O'Connor. But they, unlike O'Connor, are not
separately analyzed because a look at the importance of The Federalist to them during the
Rehnquist years did not differ from that in previous periods. Moreover, as will be seen
below, an analysis of Justice O'Connor's use of The Federalist Papers gives far'greater
insight into the importance or lack of importance of The Federalist Papers to the Court's
analysis. The analytical focus of this section will thus be on only eight of the thirteen Justices
who served during this period, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter,
O'Connor, Breyer, Stevens, and Kennedy.
456 Like all such generalizations, how the Justices come out is not always predictable. See,
e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority that also
included Justice O'Connor, striking down Colorado constitutional amendment restricting
rights of gays and lesbians); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
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1. Justice Scalia
As noted previously, Justice Scalia cited The Federalist in twenty-two opinions.
Many, if not most, of these opinions cited multiple Federalist Papers. To put
Justice Scalia's use of The Federalist in perspective, he accounted for 19 percent of
the opinions in which The Federalist Papers were cited.457 Of Scalia's twenty-two
opinions, 41 percent were dissents and 27 percent were concurrences. Put another
way, more than two-thirds of Justice Scalia's opinions which cited The Federalist,
either disagreed with the Court's result or had a different theory of or approach to
the case than the majority.
In terms of the importance of The Federalist Papers either to Justice Scalia's
analysis or to his desired outcome, surprisingly few cases fit into the important or
significant category. Twelve (54.5 percent) of Justice Scalia's opinions contained
citations that were entirely unimportant - the opinions could have done just as well
without mentioning The Federalist Papers.458 In four of the opinions (18 percent),
some of the citations had analytical significance while others were unimportant. In
only six of Justice Scalia's opinions (27 percent) were the citations to The Federalist
Papers uniformly a significant element of his analysis. Printz v. United States459 has
been previously discussed, making separate analysis here unnecessary, 460 except to
say Justice Scalia cited The Federalist a remarkable twenty-two times. In the other
term limits for United States congresspersons); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joining Justices Blackmun, Souter, and
Stevens to reaffirm, albeit in a more restricted way, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
411 What makes this figure all the more remarkable is that, when Justice Scalia's total is
added to Justice Stevens's (twenty-three), two Justices, one "liberal" and the other
"conservative," accounted for 39 percent of the opinions in which The Federalist Papers
were cited.
458 This is not to suggest that Justice Scalia (or any other Justice with respect to whom this
observation might be made) did not personally believe the citations were important. It may
be important to an originalist judge, particularly one who is proselytizing an originalist
methodology of constitutional interpretation, that The Federalist be cited at every juncture
where such a citation might have even the most remote connection to the issue in the case.
See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 299-300 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing in
a First Amendment political association case Federalist No. 10 only to make the point that
Madison may have been the first to point out that the dangers of factionalism decreases as
the size of the governmental unit grows); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977 & n.7
(1991) (citing The Federalist Nos. 24 and 47 in an Eighth amendment case only to
underscore the obvious proposition that Framers must have been familiar with state
constitutions). I make no judgment on such "strategic" citations. The only question this paper
seeks to determine is the objective importance of the citation either to the opinion's favored
result, the analysis-that lead to that result, or both.
459 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
460 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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four cases, 46 1 while the Papers were not cited as often as in Printz, they played an
equally important role. In Tafflin, the issue was whether Congress could abolish the
concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts without being explicit about it.
Justice Scalia cited Federalist No. 78 as conclusive proof that Congress could not.
462
Plaut involved an old issue about the sanctity ofjudicial decisions and judgments. 463
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia found that The Federalist demonstrated that the Framers
did not contemplate legislative interference with judicial decisions - the exercise
of "legislative equity" as the Court described it.4' In Hatter, Justice Scalia believed
that Federalist No. 79 was crucial to determining the Framers' belief that the
absence of taxation was not part of a judge's compensation within the meaning of
the Compensation Clause.4" Only in Mistretta might there be some question about
the importance of The Federalist to the analysis. On one hand, Justice Scalia's
dissent from the Court's decision to uphold the sentencing guidelines established by
the Sentencing Commission devoted a whole (albeit short) section of his opinion to
Federalist No. 4 7.466 It is difficult to tell, however, whether he did so because he
believed the majority misunderstood James Madison or because he believed that
Federalist No. 47 affirmatively supported his view (not shared by any other member
of the Court) that separation of powers principles prevented Congress from
delegating its powers to an independent commission.467
Four cases present a "mixed bag," containing some citations that are essential to
Justice Scalia's reasoning and some that are not." Two require some explanation.
Justice Scalia's citation to The Federalist No. 10 in Croson4" is arguably important
461 United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557,583-84 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (No. 79); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221-23 (1995)
(Nos. 48, 81, and 78); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 470 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing No. 78); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1073 (1989) (No. 47).
462 Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 470.
46' See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (striking down a con-
gressional statute that precluded a court from entering judgment in favor of individuals
pardoned for support of the Confederacy).
4" Plaut, 514 U.S. at 221-22.
461 532 U.S. at 583-84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
466 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
467 Id. at 427.
468 Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 903 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (No. 78); id. at 904 n.4 (No. 48); id. at 905 (No. 76); id. at 906 (Nos. 48
and 49); id. at 907 (Nos. 73,51, 78, and 79); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 523 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (No. 10); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (No. 47); id. at 698 (Nos. 73 and 51); id. at 699 (No.
51); id. at 704 (No. 51); id. at 705 (No. 49); id. at 711 (No. 78); id. at 720 (No. 81); id. at 726
(No. 51); id. at 729 (No. 70); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S.
787, 818, 824 (1987) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment) (No. 78).
469 488 U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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to the distinction that he drew between congressionally-drawn racial classifications
and those promulgated by state and local governments.47 The difficulty lies with his
rejection of that distinction six years later in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.471
It is possible that he changed his mind between Croson and Adarand, in which case
Croson should be classified as "important" and included with the six cases noted
above. On the other hand, it is also possible that the citation to Federalist No. 10
was only strategic, i.e., one that would allow him to distinguish the only previous
precedent - a case allowing a set-aside for minority contractors.472 If the latter is
the case, then the mention of Federalist No. 10 is not particularly important to his
opinion; it is merely a convenient way to dispose of an argument that, for totally
different reasons, he does not accept. The decision to include Croson in this "mixed
bag" category simply splits the difference.
Justice Scalia's use of The Federalist Papers in Morrison v. Olsen473 is also
somewhat baffling. The nature of the issue in Morrison, whether the act creating the
independent counsel was a violation of the Appointments Clause47 4 (a constitutional
separation of powers issue),475 calls out for mining original understanding. Conse-
quently, Justice Scalia cites six different Federalist Papers on nine different pages.476
The first five Federalist citations support Scalia's assertion that Congress's creating
the Office of the Independent Counsel violated Article 11. 7 Nevertheless, most of
his argument was precedent-based, not historical in the documentary sense. In other
words, Scalia's reasoning did not rest to any significant degree on original under-
standing. Regardless of the classifications of Morrison and Croson, however, the
percentage of the cases in which The Federalist played a substantial role in Justice
Scalia's opinions remains well under half of the opinions in which he cited The
Federalist Papers (36 percent).
The twelve opinions in which The Federalist citations were unimportant or
immaterial will not be separately analyzed. These citations run the gamut from what
can be described as sarcasm, 478 to supporting well-understood principles that need
470 See generally id. at 520-29.
471 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
("In my view, government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the
basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction."
(citing J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment))).
472 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
4" 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
414 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
471 Morrison, 487 U.S. 654.
476 See supra note 468.
471 See Morrison, 481 U.S. at 698-99, 704-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
478 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 84 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Nos. 6 and
11).
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479 480
no support, to a gratuitous observation, to repeating what previous cases, in
reliance on The Federalist, had already determined.48" ' In terms of the opinions in
which it was cited, Justice Scalia used The Federalist as what seems to be little more
than window-dressing.
2. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy cited The Federalist Papers in significantly fewer opinions
(fourteen) than did Justice Scalia (nineteen). Of those, half were either dissents (7
percent) or concurrences (43 percent).482 In terms of the importance that The
Federalist played in Justice Kennedy's opinions, his track record is significantly
worse than that of Justice Scalia. In only three of his opinions (25 percent) can his
use of The Federalist Papers be characterized as an essential element of his
reasoning.483 The Federalist Papers played the most significant role in Alden,48
where The Federalist No. 81 was key to the Court's conclusion that immunity from
lawsuits founded upon federal law was essential to maintaining state sovereignty,
even where the suit was filed in state rather than federal court.485 This is contrasted
"' See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 31 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing No. 83 in regards to the importance ofjury trial); Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 393-94 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (pointing out that the judiciary possesses neither "force nor will"
(citing THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Beloffed., 1987))); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (No. 48 regarding Madison's view that
judicial prerogatives are uncertain).
480 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 366 (2001) (citing Federalist No. 82 in the denial of
Tribal Court's jurisdiction to hear Section 1983 claims).
41 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 780 n.1 (1991) (No. 81).
482 Two (17 percent) were dissents while five (42 percent ) were concurrences.
483 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (Nos. 39, 20, 15); id. at 715 (No. 39); id. at
716-17 (No. 81); id. at 729 (No. 81); id. at 730 (No. 81); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33,
65 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (No. 78); id. at 69
(No. 48); id. at 81 (No. 51); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,468 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (Nos. 47-51); id. at 471 (No. 78); id. at 483 & n.4
(Nos. 76 and 66). A rhetorical flourish was provided by The Federalist No. 51 in Jenkins,
495 U.S. at 81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); however,
Kennedy's references to The Federalist Nos. 78 and 48 were central to his contention that
the federal judiciary has no power to levy a tax. Id. at 65, 69.
4'4 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
485 Citations to The Federalist Nos. 39, 20, and 15, were clearly important to building the
historical case for sovereign immunity in a case where the suit was filed in state court. Id.
at 714-15. But these citations were not as central as the references to No. 81. Id. at 716-17,
729, 730. As previously noted, Professor McGowan singles out the Court's citation of The
Federalist No. 81 in its sovereign immunity cases as particularly inappropriate. See
McGowan, supra note 17, at 827-28.
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with the other Eleventh Amendment case in which Justice Kennedy wrote an
opinion: Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho.486 The principle of sovereign
immunity from federal law claims asserted in federal courts had long since been
established." 7 The only question was whether there was something about the claim
itself that might except it from the proscription of the Eleventh Amendment.4""
Precedent thus played a far more important role than did historical understanding.
Alden, on the other hand, broke new ground, thus requiring independent constitu-
tional support.
Public Citizen489 was the third case in which The Federalist Papers were an
essential element of Justice Kennedy's reasoning. The question was whether the
Federal Advisory Committee Act could be used to secure the names of potential
nominees to the federal bench from the committee established by the American Bar
Association to screen such nominees. 4 Justice Kennedy, while concurring in the
judgment, disagreed with the majority's determination that Congress never intended
the Act to reach this committee.49" ' He preferred instead to invoke the Appointments
Clause of Article 11.492 The Federalist was the centerpiece of his assertion that access
to the ABA committee's deliberations would violate the President's appointment
powers.493
In terms of his use of The Federalist, the most surprising of Justice Kennedy's
opinions was his concurring opinion in Lopez v. United States.494 While it is true that
The Federalist was not at all important to Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion,495
Justice Kennedy's opinion was focused on a somewhat different issue, the inter-
section of congressional and judicial authority.496 As the analysis of Justice Scalia's
opinions demonstrates, one might have predicted that Justice Kennedy would also
have seen TheFederalistPapers as determinative ofjudicial/congressional separation
of powers concerns. That, however, was not the case. Kennedy cited Federalist No.
51 for the obvious principle that each branch will help control the other,497 and The
Federalist No. 46 was cited only to suggest a proposition that Justice Kennedy
486 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (No. 81); id. at 271 (No. 80).
487 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
488 See Idaho, 521 U.S. at 261.
489 Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
490 Id.
491 Id. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring injudgment) ("Although I believe the Court's result
is quite sensible, I cannot go along with the unhealthy process of amending the statute by
judicial interpretation.").
492 Id. at 482.
491 Id. at 483 &n.4.
494 514 U.S. 549, 567-83 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
495 See infra note 529 and accompanying text.
496 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
491 Id. at 576.
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ultimately rejects, that federalism values were designed to be protected politically,
not judicially.498
The only other case in which it might be argued that at least one of Justice
Kennedy's Federalist citations was significant to either his analysis or outcome was
Loving v. United States.4 The two citations to No. 47 only demonstrated that
separation of powers enhances individual liberty."° The mention ofNo. 23, however,
is an important piece of Kennedy's conclusion that Congress, not the Executive, has
the ultimate power to impose punishment on military personnel."' The difficulty
in ascertaining his reliance on The Federalist Papers is that Justice Kennedy con-
cludes that Congress delegated its authority to the Executive with certain provisions
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 2 Because it must be that either Congress
or the Executive has authority to impose penalties on military personnel, Justice
Kennedy's reliance on The Federalist No. 23 to establish that Congress has that
power was academic and had no impact on the final decision.
Citations to The Federalist were unimportant in the remainder of Justice
Kennedy's opinions. Three of the cases were civil rights or individual liberties
cases. 3 in which the importance of The Federalist Papers might be questioned."
One was a statutory preemption case in which two Federalist Papers were men-
tioned only for historical background purposes. 5 One was a Dormant Commerce
Clause matter in which The Federalist No. 22 is cited, again, only for historical
background.50 6 Finally, in Cook v. Gralike,0 7 Justice Kennedy only referenced The
Federalist Papers generally and then only to suggest that "'nothing in ... The
Federalist Papers... supports [the claim].' 5 8 Indeed, one might plausibly argue
that such a general reference, used as it was, should be eliminated from the count
altogether.
498 Id. at 577.
499 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (No. 47); id. at 757 (No. 47); id, at 767 (No. 23).
500 Id. at 756-57.
'o' Id. at 767.
502 Id. at 768-69.
.03 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,601 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (No. 49);
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,172 (1989) (citing Federalist No. 78 with
regards to racial harassment); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
710 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Federalist No. 10 in a First Amendment case).
" But see the discussion, supra note 483, of Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 65,69, 81
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), for a case in which
Justice Kennedy makes important use of the Papers.
'0' Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,446 (1994) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Nos.
22 and 80).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
507 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
508 Id. at 528 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (first alteration and second omission in original)
(quoting U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,842 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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3. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas cited The Federalist Papers in ten of his opinions." Of those
ten opinions, four were dissents and four were concurrences. And in only two of the
ten (20 percent) were his references to The Federalist Papers an important element
in either his analysis or in the result he reached. In United States v. Lopez,"' Justice
Thomas, while agreeing with the result, urged the Court to reconsider the "substantial
effects" test for determining the scope of Congress's commerce powers.5"' Why?
Because, according to Thomas, the Framers meant commerce to include only buying,
selling, and transporting. 1 2 The Federalist was central to sustaining this position.
Indeed, Justice Thomas cited fifteen different Federalist Papers in his concurring
opinion."3 While it is possible to question whether any individual citation is central
to his thesis, unquestionably the package of Federalist references are a significant
part of his analysis. Finally, Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court in Federal
Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,514 while citing only
two Papers, relied on The Federalist No. 81 to conclude that adjudicative actions
by federal administrative agencies are the equivalent of a civil action.515 Conse-
quently, such actions run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.
516
The most surprising use of The Federalist Papers in any of Justice Thomas's
opinions is in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.5 17 Thornton relies very strongly
on originalist analysis, more than any other case decided by the Rehnquist Court
except Printz. All the major arguments, both by Justice Stevens in his majority
opinion and by Justice Thomas in his dissent, focus on whether the Framers
509 The count includes two cases in which the mention of The Federalist Papers was so
marginal and tangential to the discussion that I considered removing them from Justice
Thomas's ledger. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,779 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (referencing generally to The Federalist in a statement that faults the
majority for failing to find anything in the historical record, including The Federalist, that
suggests that the Framers intended to adopt the English system of shared military authority).
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Committee, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), The Federalist Papers are
mentioned, in the first instance as an example of anonymously published political pamphlets,
id. at 360, and in the second, only to say they exist. Id. at 370. Despite this, I decided to
include these cases only because a LEXIS search revealed the citations and other studies may
have, as a result, included them in their count.
510 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
511 Id. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
512 Id. at 585-86.
513 Id. at 584-603.
114 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
5' Id. at 752 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-88 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed., 1961)). Thomas's other citation, to Federalist No. 39, is far less important. Id at 751.
516 Fed. Maritime Comm 'n, 535 U.S. 743.
517 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
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contemplated that states could impose qualifications on federal congresspersons in
addition to those imposed by Article I18 The Federalist is heavily relied upon by
Justice Stevens, and Justice Thomas's dissent cites six different Papers on eleven
different occasions.519 Eight of those are in footnotes, however, not the text. Further-
more, half of the citations are to The Federalist No. 52. In none of those latter
references does Thomas analyze what The Federalist No. 52 says regarding his
position. He cites that Paper only to rebut what he argues is Justice Stevens's misread-
ing of its message. Nowhere does Justice Thomas cite The Federalist to demonstrate
that the states were assumed to have the authority to attach a term limit qualification
to federal legislators. This is not to say that his opinion has nothing to say about the
Framers' understanding. It does say, however, that The Federalist was a very minor
part of Justice Thomas's historical analysis.52
In sum, Justice Thomas's analysis of original understanding neither begins nor
ends with The Federalist Papers. Where pertinent, he will cite them, but often only
in aid of other historical materials that point in the same direction. Thus, upon
reflection, it is not particularly surprising how little he relied on The Federalist.
4. Chief Justice Rehnquist
The Chief Justice mentioned The Federalist in nine cases, all of which were in
majority opinions. The importance of The Federalist Papers to his analysis followed
the pattern during the Burger Court era before he became Chief Justice."' With only
two possible exceptions, the Chief Justice's citations were of only marginal value in
supporting his arguments. The clear exception is Nixon v. United States, 22 in which
the issue was whether the judiciary could review the process adopted by the Senate
518 Id
5'9 Id. at 869 n. 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (No. 56); id, at 872 n.13 (No. 32); id. at 880
(No. 52); id. at 885 n.18 (No. 18); id at 890 n.20 (No. 52); id. at 898 n.22 (No. 52); id at
900-01 (No. 52); id. at 902 (No. 52); id. at 902 n.28 (No. 57); id. at 913 n.37 (No. 56).
520 A cynic might suggest that The Federalist Papers were not essential to Thomas's
argument because they provided no support for his conclusion. The Federalist Papers also
were of no importance in the four other cases in which Thomas cited them. See Utah v.
Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 501 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (No.
54); id. (No. 36); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
612-13 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (No. 32); id. at 613 n.6 (No. 32). Like Justice
Thomas's opinion in Thornton, his opinion in Camps Newfoundland contains an extensive
historical analysis, covering some twenty pages. Id. at 621-40. The Federalist does not figure
prominently in that analysis, however. See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 414 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (No. 35); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (No. 42).
521 See supra Part II.G.4.
.22 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
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to try impeachment decisions. 23 Chief Justice Rehnquist relied largely on an
historical analysis, referring to six different Federalist Papers. 4 While it is hard
to describe all of The Federalist citations as important parts of his analysis, some
were independently important and collectively they clearly helped to bolster his
conclusion. The other possible exception is Solorio v. United States, 25 in which the
Court faced the question whether Congress could permit the military to try military
personnel for crimes having nothing to do with an individual's military service.526
While the Chief Justice only cited once to one Paper,527 it was the starting point for
a long historical discussion of the issue presented by the case, and also supported his
conclusion that Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, giving Congress the power to "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the [armed] forces," should be inter-
preted according to its plain meaning. 28
Chief Justice Rehnquist's citations to The Federalist Papers in certain cases are
also surprising. His one citation to The Federalist No. 45 in Lopez529 adds nothing
to either his analysis or the result. The same is true with respect to his mention of
The Federalist No. 81 in two of the significant Eleventh Amendment cases decided
during this period, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida53 and Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank.53' Maybe the
importance of Federalist No. 81 was old hat by 1996, having first been prominently
cited in 1890.532 This might explain the first citation in Seminole Tribe, which was
nothing more than a quote from Hans that itself quoted Federalist No. 81, and the
one mention of that Paper in Florida Prepaid which likewise appeared from a quote
from Seminole Tribe.5 34 Be that as it may, precedent, not The Federalist, was the
support for the results. In the other four cases it is clear that the citations to The
Federalist Papers were little more than a formality.
35
523 id.
524 Id. at 233 (No. 78); id. at 233-34 (No. 65); id. at 235 (Nos. 79 and 81); id. at 236 (No.
66); id. at 237 (No. 60).
525 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
526 Id. ("[T]here is no evidence in the debates over the adoption of the Constitution that
the Framers intended the language of Clause 14 to be accorded anything other than its plain
meaning.").
527 Id. at 441 (No. 23).
528 Id.
529 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
530 517 U.S. 44, 54, 69, 70 n.13 (1996).
53 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999).
532 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1890).
133 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961))).
514 527 U.S. at 634 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)).
... Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997) (No. 62); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
413-14 (1993) (No. 74); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S, 37, 43 (1990) (No. 43); United
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5. Justice O'Connor
One of the strongest advocates for judicial maintenance of a federalist balance,
Justice O'Connor cited The Federalist Papers in ten of her opinions, eight of which
were majority opinions; one was a concurrence, and the other a dissent. The citations
in four of those opinions were unimportant; throwaways might be a more accurate
description. Two of the cases, Boos v. Berr5 36 and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass n,117 did not involve structural issues at all, but were First Amendment
cases. In both cases, The Federalist was mentioned only by way of a "cf" reference. 38
Two federalism cases in which O'Connor penned the majority opinions would,
at first blush, cry out for Federalist citations. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,139 Justice
O'Connor cited three Federalist Papers: Nos. 45, 28, and 51 ;540 however, Federalist
No. 45 is mentioned only for the most general of propositions, that the federal
government has "'few and defined powers' while states have "'numerous and
undefined powers.""'54  Furthermore, Nos. 28 and 51 only established that one
government will check the abuses of others,"2 a common and rarely-denied notion.
Most curious is how she used The Federalist Papers in New York v. United
States,543 Justice O'Connor's ground-breaking opinion on federal commandeering of
state legislative processes.5" In New York v. United States, she cited to seven different
Federalist Papers, along with one general reference, on eight separate occasions.545
The first six citations, including the general reference to The Federalist Papers,
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (No. 84).
536 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
117 485 U. S. 439 (1988).
538 Boos, 485 U.S. at 323 (No. 43); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452 (No. 10); see also Tafflin v.
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1989) (No. 82 listed as part of string of citations); Gutierrez de
Martinez v. Lamango, 515 U.S. 417, 438 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citing the majority's reference to The Federalist No. 10 earlier
in the decision).
539 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
540 Id. at 458 (No. 45); id. at 459 (Nos. 28 and 51). It is true that Gregory was decided on
statutory grounds, but the reason the Court did not interpret the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act to apply to Missouri's mandatory retirement for judges was because the
retirement decision "is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity." Id.
at 460.
541 Id. at 458 (quoting THE FEDERALISTNO. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
542 Id. at 459.
143 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
'44 Justice O'Connor previewed her anti-commandeering theory in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775-97 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment and dissenting in part).
141 505 U.S. at 155 (No. 82); id. at 158 (No. 42); id. at 163 (Nos. 15 and 16); id. at 180
(general reference and Nos. 42 and 20); id, at 182 (No. 51); id. at 188 (No. 39).
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served little function except to illustrate well-known and very general principles.
The Federalist No. 20 was somewhat more important; it was cited in support of a
theory of dual federalism: "' sovereignty over sovereigns... is a solecism in theory,
so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity.""'5 The Federalist
No. 51 only appeared in a quoted portion of Gregory v. Ashcroft, in which it played
no role at all in the Court's analysis. 47 Federalist No. 39 was cited in a very general
way to demonstrate that the Constitution leaves the states with a residual sover-
eignty.48 One could have equally cited the Tenth Amendment or randomly picked
almost any Commerce Clause case decided in the past sixty years. This is not a
criticism of Justice O'Connor's historicism; that is well beyond the scope of this
paper. It is only to say that both during the current and previous periods549 Justice
O'Connor's relatively frequent use of The Federalist Papers mask their lack of
probative value to her analyses.
6. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens cited The Federalist in twenty-four opinions, five more than
Justice Scalia. Of those, twelve (50 percent) were dissents and one (4 percent) was
a concurrence. Nearly half of the citations appeared in majority opinions. Compare
that to Justice Stevens's record during the Burger Court era, where he cited The
Federalist in only one opinion.550 Even discounting the fact that he served for only
ten of the sixteen years of the Burger period, the difference is nothing short of
remarkable."5 '
The one thing that did not change, however, is the importance that Justice
Stevens apparently attached to The Federalist Papers. In only two cases were The
s" Id. at 180 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 138 (James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)). But that says very little about the nature and scope of a
state's "sovereignty," much less something about why the federal government cannot require
the states to regulate according to federal standards in an area of federal competence. Justice
O'Connor's arguments on that issue have nothing to do with The Federalist. See id. at
168-69.
141 Id. at 181-82 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
548 Id. at 188.
149 See supra Part II.G.5.
550 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 419 & n.16 (1979) (No. 81).
"' One possible explanation, of course, is that Justice Stevens had an epiphany at some
point after 1986. More likely explanations, however, may include the changing nature of the
constitutional conversation among the Justices prompted by Justice Scalia and, to a
somewhat lesser degree, Justice Thomas; the nature of the issues presented in cases in which
he wrote opinions; and the kinds of cases the Court chose to hear in one era as opposed to
the other.
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Federalist Papers undeniably important either to Justice Stevens's analysis or his
conclusion. 52 And in only three others (and more likely only two) could a colorable
argument be made that The Federalist Papers played anything more than a cere-
monial function. 3 The vast majority of Justice Stevens's opinions (78 percent)
mentioned The Federalist Papers for reasons unrelated, at least substantively, to
their effect on his reasoning or analysis." 4
552 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,939-70 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting); U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
... The two cases where The Federalist arguably played an important role were
Metropolitan Washington AirportsAuthority v. CitizensforAbatement ofAircraft Noise, 501
U.S. 252, 274, 277 (1991) (No. 48), and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479
U.S. 208, 234 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (No. 52). The third case, United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385,403 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (No. 58),
is included only because Justice Stevens cited a portion of Justice Marshall's majority
opinion in which The Federalist was cited and that citation was important to Marshall's
opinion. Id. (citing Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 395 (majority opinion) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 58, at 359 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961))). That may be enough to make
the argument colorable, although it does not necessarily persuade me.
"" In some of these seventeen cases the nature of the issue might suggest that The
Federalist Papers would not play a determinative role. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 251 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (No. 10) (race discrimination);
Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 711 (1995) (No. 78) (statutory construction);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (general reference) (First
Amendment political speech); Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,267 n.20 (1994)
(No. 44) (Title VII sexual harassment); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072
n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (No. 10) (Takings Clause); City of Columbia v. Omni
OutdoorAdvert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 389 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (No. 10) (anti-trust
exemption); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 83 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (general reference) (First Amendment); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 106
n. 1 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (No. 3 7) (interpretation of Social Security Act). In other
cases the issue might have lent itself to a Federalist Papers analysis, but Justice Stevens
chose not toplace reliance upon them. See, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521 nn. 6-7
(2000) (Nos. 44 and 84) (ex post facto laws); id. at 532 (No. 84) (ex post facto laws); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (No. 78) (Eleventh
Amendment and Section 5 powers); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 650 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (No. 43) (Eleventh
Amendment); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) (No. 51) (presidential immunity
from civil law suits); id. at 703 (No. 47) (presidential immunity from civil law suits);
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 92-93 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (No.
81) (Eleventh Amendment); Calif. Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 515 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (Nos. 44 and 84) (ex post facto laws); Quill v. North Dakota, 504
U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (Nos. 7 and 11) (Dormant Commerce Clause); Howlett v. Rose, 496
U.S. 356, 368-69 (1990) (No. 82) (concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts);
Perpitch v. Dept. ofDef., 496 U.S. 334,340 n.6 (1990) (No. 25) (presidential control of state
National Guard Units); id. at 354 n.28 (No. 23) (presidential control of state national guard
units).
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The two opinions in which The Federalist Papers did play a decisive role in
Justice Stevens's analysis and result were, not surprisingly, Printz and Thornton,
where both majority and dissenting Justices focused almost exclusively on original
understanding. Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Thornton.. is, like Justice
Souter's dissenting opinion in Printz,556 founded almost exclusively upon The
Federalist Papers, particularly Federalist No. 52.15 ' Indeed, Justice Thomas's
citation of The Federalist is largely limited to his attempts to demonstrate that
Stevens read too much into The Federalist No. 52."'
The centrality of The Federalist Papers to Justice Scalia's majority opinion and
Justice Souter's dissent in Printz has been previously noted. The Federalist Papers
were equally important to Justice Stevens's analysis. He cited them on six occasions."'
Half were to The Federalist No. 27,5o the same Paper that determined the issue for
Justice Souter. Two of the other references were also important to Stevens's
analysis. 561 Only his citation to The Federalist No. 36 was insignificant. 62
7. Justice Souter
Justice Souter cited The Federalist in twelve opinions, two more than Justice
Thomas and only one more than Chief Justice Rehnquist. Six (50 percent) were
dissenting opinions and one was a concurrence. In only two of those cases did The
Federalist Papers contribute importantly to Justice Souter's analysis or the result he
reached. First and foremost was Printz. The Federalist determined his position that
Congress could "commandeer" state officers to enforce federal law. 63 The other, and
far more obscure, case was Weiss v. United States,s64 in which the question was
whether a military officer whose commission had been approved by the Senate had
to be confirmed again if he was appointed to serve as ajudge on a military tribunal. 65
The Federalist Nos. 48,566 76 and 77,567 while not "determinative" as in Printz, were
5 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
556 521 U.S. at 970-76 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117 Justice Stevens cited seven separate Papers -Nos. 60,52,32, 57,59,36, and 15. US.
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 792,794,801,806,808 & n.18, 809, 819,820 n.30, 821, 822 n.32,
833.
558 See supra notes 520-21 and accompanying text.
"9 Printz, 521 U.S. at 943 & n.3, 945, 947, 948 & n.7, 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'60 Id. at 945, 947-48 & n.7.
561 Id. at 943 & n.3 (No. 44); id. at 945 (No. 15).
562 Id. at 959.
563 Id. at 971 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is The Federalist that finally determines my
position."). Justice Souter cited six different Papers on eleven different occasions in a seven-
page opinion. Id. at 970-76.
'64 510 U.S. 163 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
565 Id.
566 Id. at 188.
567 Id. at 185 & n. 1.
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nevertheless part and parcel of Justice Souter's original understanding argument.
Indeed, as in Printz, The Federalist was authoritative for Souter on the Framers'
understanding.568
In the other eight cases, The Federalist played little more than a supporting role,
if that. Three of those cases were federalism cases that were at least, if not more,
significant than Printz: United States v. Morrison,5 69 Alden v. Maine,570 and Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida.7' In Morrison, Justice Souter cited four different
Federalist Papers, yet none of these references had any particular significance.572
Justice Souter mentioned The Federalist No. 81 twice in Alden, 73 but only to refute
the majority's reliance on it; it did not form an essential component of Justice
Souter's argument in chief. Similarly, in Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter mentioned
Federalist Nos. 81 and 32 numerous times, but only to disagree with the majority's
interpretation of them. 74 They were not cited to demonstrate his claim that the
states relinquished sovereign immunity with respect to the exercise of Congress's




To devote a separate subsection to Justice Breyer is probably not justified except
for the fact that he cited The Federalist Papers in ten of his opinions during this
period, equal to Justices O'Connor and Thomas, and only one shy of Justice Souter. 77
568 As noted previously, the authoritativeness of The Federalist to original understanding
is a separate question from the authoritativeness of The Federalist Papers to the analysis or
outcome of the case. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. This paper analyzes only the
latter.
569 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
570 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
57, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
572 529 U.S. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting) (No. 45); id. at 638 n.l 1 (No. 84); id. at 648
(No. 46); id at 650 (No. 62).
173 527 U.S. at 763, 773 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114 517 U.S. at 144-48 (Souter, J., dissenting).
171 Id. Souter mentioned one other Paper, The Federalist No. 82, but that, too, was not
central to his analysis. Id. at 149 n.42.
576 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 382 n.16 (2000) (No. 80);
Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 449 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (No.
10); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995) (Nos. 7, 42, and
11); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 546 n.6
(1995) (No. 80). Interestingly, in Gutierrez, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), FederalistNo. 10 was cited
in each of the opinions written: Justice Ginsburg's majority, id. at 428, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence, id at 438, and Justice Souter's dissent. Id. at 448. In no opinion did The
Federalist play any particular role in either the analysis or the result.
... Just by way of comparison, three cases in which he mentioned The Federalist were
majority opinions, six were dissents, and one was a concurrence.
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Yet when his ten opinions are closely studied, in none of them was The Federalist
anything more than a bit player. Some of this is explicable on grounds having
relatively little to do with where Justice Breyer places The Federalist on his ladder
of importance. His dissenting opinion in Printz mentioned Federalist No. 20 only
once by way of a "cf" citation. 78 But his dissent was based upon what we can learn
from other federal systems. 79 In Foster v. Florida,58 ° he mentioned The Federalist
No. 63, but that opinion was a dissent from the denial of a writ of certiorari, not the
place that one would ordinarily expect an extensive analysis of the issue posed.
His other opinions, however, do not indicate that Justice Breyer relied upon The
Federalist in adjudicating contemporary constitutional disputes. Just by way of
example, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,'81 his citations to The Federalist Nos. 4 7
and 48 were only to say that he agreed that Justice Scalia had made a persuasive
historical case that Congress had no authority to reopen and revise final judgments.582
In UnitedStates v. Hatter,"3 Breyer's majority opinion cites three different Federalist
Papers on four occasions,5 but the first three were only to establish that federal
judges should not be beholden to another branch for their compensation, a propo-
sition fairly obvious at this point and in any event far too general to have much
bearing on the specific issue of whether the social security tax as applied to federal
judges violated the compensation clause of Article III. His later citation to Federalist
No. 79 was not particularly persuasive on the question of whether subsequent raises
for federal judges cured the previous unconstitutional reductions.8 5 Admittedly, one
might argue these conclusions. But if Justice Breyer's Federalist citations and, in
particular his citations to The Federalist No. 79 are compared to Justice Scalia's use
of the Papers in his-concurring opinion,586 the difference is hard to ignore. In any
event, there can be no dispute about his use of The Federalist in the other five
cases. 587
578 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer, however, joined the opinion of Justice Stevens, where The Federalist was of some
significance.
.v9 Id. at 976-78.
580 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
581 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
582 Id. at 241 (Breyer, J., concurring). He also mentioned The Federalist No. 48 again, but
that was part of a "see" citation. Id. at 245.
583 532 U.S. 557 (2001).
584 Id. at 567 (No. 78); id. at 568 (Nos. 79 and 48); id. at 579 (No. 79).
585 Id. at 579.
586 See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
587 Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 477 (2002) (Nos. 54, 55, and 58) (string of citations);
Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417,482 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (No. 51); Kansas
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 396 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (No. 78); Clinton v. Jones,
520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (No. 70); id. at 713 (No.
71); Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (No. 78).
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What does this tell us about the Rehnquist Court in the sixteen years from 1986
through 2002? Certainly, as others have established,18 there has been a dramatic
increase in Federalist Papers "activity" compared with the previous sixteen years
of the Burger Court. However, measured by the number of opinions in which The
Federalist was cited, the increase was not nearly as dramatic as was that during the
Burger years over the Warren Court, a nearly identical period of time. Given the
smaller base-line established in the Warren years, that is understandable. Neverthe-
less, an increased use of The Federalist Papers began in 1969. The Rehnquist Court
has continued that pattern, albeit at a somewhat decreased rate.
The pattern that does not seem to have changed very much is the importance (or
lack thereof) of The Federalist Papers to the analyses and outcomes of the opinions
that made use of them. There are obvious exceptions, Printz and Thornton being the
prime examples. But exceptions do not establish rules. Moreover, other than Justice
Scalia, there is no discernable pattern to any particular Justice's use of The Federalist
Papers. Justice Stevens based his Thornton opinion on them, as did Justice Souter
in his Printz dissent. Justice Thomas did not rely to any significant extent on The
Federalist Papers to support his reasoning in Thornton but did in Lopez and Jenkins.
The same can be said of Justice Kennedy - in some cases The Federalist Papers
carried the day, in others they were only thrown in for good measure. Justice
O'Connor relied upon them neither during the Rehnquist nor Burger years. Even
Justice Scalia, who showed the most consistent use of The Federalist Papers to
make his point, did so in well less than half of the opinions in which he referred to
them. Consequently, as in the previous eras, the numbers do not tell the whole story
of the importance of The Federalist Papers to- our jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Can one then reach the more general conclusion, as the title to this paper
suggests, that the influence of The Federalist has been less than meets the eye? The
Federalist Papers were advocacy, which today might resemble sophisticated "op-
ed" pieces or essays in the magazines of the intelligentsia. But their importance,
both thens1 9 and today, is far more significant. As Gordon Wood put it, the
Constitution embodied a "political theory worthy of a prominent place in the history
of Western thought." ' The Federalist Papers play a prominent role in explicating
588 Lupu, The Supreme Court and The Federalist, supra note 14, at 1328; Buckner F.
Melton, Jr., The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A Citation List and Analysis,
1789-1996, 85 Ky. L.J. 243, 339 (1997).
589 See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
27 (1988) (noting that Madison relied on The Federalist in a late-in-life essay about the
constitutionality of protective tariffs); Rakove, supra note 17. But see Kramer, Putting the
Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, supra note 47.
590 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 615
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and understanding that revolutionary political theory. Nothing said in this paper
disputes that, nor was there any intention to do so. The only question this paper
hoped to clarify was whether The Federalist Papers had an influence on the develop-
ment of constitutional outcomes that matched their rhetorical use. Despite the fact
that some scholarship either explicitly or implicitly assumes that the answer is yes,
my reading of the cases does not support that conclusion. So clichd though it might
be, the answer to whether there is less here than meets the eye depends upon how you
look at it.
Even accepting that no qualitative analysis is wholly objective, there are,
nevertheless, certain conclusions that should be rather obvious. First, it is hard to
come up with more than a small handful of cases where The Federalist even
arguably played a decisive role in the Court's decision. Printz and Thornton, both
decided during the Rehnquist years, lead the pack. From there the drop-off is
significant. Maybe The Passenger Cases decided by the Taney Court, Pollock v.
Farmers'Loan & Trust Co. decided in 1895, and Hans v. Louisiana decided five
years earlier,: can be placed in the "Federalist Papers played a determinative role in
the decision" category, but that is about it.
The numbers do not increase greatly when concurring and dissenting opinions
are added to the mix, and the question is changed from the importance of The
Federalist Papers to the outcome of a decision to their impact on an individual
Justice's analysis. For example, in Myers v. United States and Dred Scott, original
understanding determined how each Justice ultimately resolved the issues. But no
Justice relied on The Federalist to any appreciable degree. That conclusion is even
more obvious in the overwhelming majority of opinions during and since the
Roosevelt Court. On the whole, then, it is difficult to assert that the apparent
influence of The Federalist Papers has matched their rhetorical use. At best, The
Federalist has been of equal importance to other historical sources.59' Certainly the
degree of disproportionality between the frequency of citation of The Federalist and
its importance may have lessened somewhat in the Rehnquist years. But even
during this period, The Federalist Papers' substantive role is nowhere near what the
numbers would suggest. One therefore has to be very circumspect about drawing
conclusions about the doctrinal importance of The Federalist simply from the
number of times it has been cited.
(1969).
591 See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLrIICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTrTUTION 347-63 (1996); Caleb Nelson, Originalism andInterpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 519 (2003); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme
Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1301 (1998); Lupu, The Supreme Court and The Federalist, supra note 14.
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Nevertheless, the remarkable increase in Federalist citations since 1969,
whether measured numerically or percentage-wise, indicates not simply that the
Court has become more conservative both in terms of the results reached and the
analyses used to reach those results, 92 but more importantly that the interpretative
conversation has shifted from the Roosevelt and Warren Courts. The opinions of
Justices Scalia,5 93 Kennedy,5'9 and Thomas595 certainly support that conclusion, as
does the fact that 50 percent of Justice Souter's citations to The Federalist were in
dissenting opinions.596 The change in the nature of the interpretative conversation
may also explain why, of the 127 cases in which The Federalist Papers appeared
during the Rehnquist years, only sixty-four (50.4 percent) were in opinions written
by Justices who are commonly thought of as conservatives.5 97 Originalist arguments
must be met with originalist arguments.5 9 On the other hand, there is remarkably
little consistency from one case to the next, even among those Justices who hew to
the originalist line, suggesting either that The Federalist Papers might sometimes
be cited for strategic or opportunistic reasons having little to do with their
interpretative value.599
Finally, and most obviously, whether The Federalist is cited at all and the
significance of the citation to the analytic structure of a Justice's argument
ultimately depends upon the individual Justice herself and the desire to attach
precedential value to an opinion.' Justices who served from 1834 to 1900 were as
originalist in their views of how the Constitution ought to be interpreted as those
who served on the Rehnquist Court. But the former largely chose to rely on other
historical documents. 1 Justices on the Burger and the Rehnquist Courts have cited
The Federalist with far more frequency than their 19th century counterparts, but The
592 But cf. William P. Marshall, The Empty Promise of Compassionate Conservatism: A
Reply to Judge Wilkinson, 90 VA. L. REv. 355, 356 (2004) (describing the "conservative"
Rehnquist Court as "activist").
193 See supra Part II.H. 1.
114 See supra Part II.H.2.
... See supra Part II.H.3.
596 See supra Part II.H.7.
... It will be recalled that Justice Stevens cited The Federalist five more times than Justice
Scalia. See supra Part II.H.I and Part II.H.6.
598 E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44(1996).
'99 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659, 669 (1987)
(arguing that "[t]he originalist's use of history is goal-directed.").
' One school of thought by political scientists posits that Justices decide the way they
do in part, if not largely, because of the need to cobble a five-Justice majority. See Barry
Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function ofJudicial Review,
72 U. CN. L. REV. 1257, 1274-75 (2004); Merrill, supra note 30, at 572-73, 601-20
(describing what the author calls "the internal strategic actor hypothesis").
60 See supra Parts II.B-C.
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Federalist Papers are relatively unimportant to all but a select few Justices. The
personal preference factor may help explain why a significant percentage of Justices
Kennedy's and Thomas's opinions in which The Federalist Papers appear are
concurring opinions, 43 percent and 40 percent respectively. These Justices agreed
with the result but as an analytical matter apparently preferred greater reliance on
original understanding.
Nonetheless, one cannot dismiss citations to The Federalist as window-dressing
even when they might appear to be so. Professor McGowan gives us one reason -
The Federalist might lend credibility to the Court, to the particular opinion, or to the
author of a particular opinion. 2 But that reason may somewhat understate why
Justices cite The Federalist Papers (or any historical source for that matter) even if
the opinion would do just as well without the reference. Citing "the Framers"
generally and The Federalist Papers particularly is the secular equivalent to citing
the Bible. It is an appeal to a higher and more revered authority. It not only
establishes an ethos of objectivity but the perception of infallibility. 3
602 See McGowan, supra note 17, at 820-24.
603 SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTTuIONALFAIT 11 (1988) (describing that the "'veneration'
of the Constitution has become a central, even if sometimes challenged, aspect of the American
political tradition"); see also Christopher E. Smith, Imagery, Politics, and Jury Reform, 28
AKRON L. REv. 77, 78 (1994) (describing how, over time, "the Constitution gained the image
and aura of a sacred text."); Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, CivilRights, and the Sacred
Text: The Legacy ofJustice Thurgood Marshall's Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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